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Abstract 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of public policies in various countries of South 
America on the development of microfinance (MF). A broad definition of public policy has been used in 
this work, as it covers specific legislation seeking to develop more inclusive financial systems; 
government participation in official bank programs; second-tier bank funds; the use of targeted funds and 
guarantee and intelligent subsidy schemes, etc. Particular attention is focused on financial system 
regulatory frameworks, as they tend to play a fundamental role in the success of such programs. An 
analysis is made of best practices recommended by international agencies, matching them against the 
existing framework for microfinance activities in the countries analyzed. The main conclusion that can be 
drawn is that despite the very varied nature of the initiatives pursued, one common element observed in 
all the countries surveyed is the role played by commercial banks in MF development. Nevertheless, note 
should be taken of the direct and indirect role played by the state in encouraging the involvement of the 
financial sector as the leading provider of MF, a role that is in general based on criteria of self-
sustainability and commercial practices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The term “microfinance” (MF) refers to the provision of banking services to lower-
income people, especially the poor.1 Such services include small loans for business or 
personal use, deposit services and money transfer, means of payment and insurance 
services, among others.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of public policies in various countries 
of South America on the development of microfinance (MF). A broad definition of 
public policy has been used in this work, as it covers specific legislation seeking to 
develop more inclusive financial systems, government participation in official bank 
programs, second-tier bank funds and the use of targeted funds, guarantee and 
intelligent subsidy schemes, etc.. These tools may be tied to certain conditions, such as 
interest rate restrictions or the need to apply a certain percentage of deposits to MF 
lending. At the same time, particular attention is focused on financial system regulatory 
frameworks, as they tend to play a fundamental role in the success of such programs.  
 
In addition, developments in MF in each of the countries studied are analyzed, and an 
attempt is made to link them to the policies implemented and the existing regulatory 
frameworks. Identification of the extent to which the policies applied and the regulatory 
frameworks have contributed to greater MF service growth is of particular interest. 
 
An interesting approach for the analysis of public policies is introduced in a recent 
working document of the World Bank (BM)2. The authors point that “while most 
economists would agree that the government can play a significant role in fostering 
financial development, there is less consensus regarding the specific nature of its 
intervention. Opinions on this issue tend to be polarized in two highly contrasting but 
well-established views: the interventionist and the laissez-faire views.”  
 
The interventionist view holds that the active intervention of the government is required 
in mobilizing and allocating financial resources, including the direct participation 
through public banks, so as to expand access to finance (this viewpoint was developed 
during the 50’s and 60’s). The tools chosen were the direct provision of loans through 
public banks, the allocation of a certain proportion of the loans to selected sectors and 
restrictions on the interest rates charged. 
 
On the other hand the laissez-faire view holds that governments can do more harm than 
good by intervening directly, and that governments efforts should restrict themselves to 
improve the enabling environment for the development of financial services. This 
viewpoint emerged as a reaction to the mentioned problems of public banking and direct 
government intervention in the previous years, but also stems from an increasing 
awareness of the role played by institutions and market infrastructures in financial 
development. According to this view, although the existing market failures are not as 
extensive as to require the government intervention and could be addressed by private 
parties themselves (given well-defined property rights). Therefore, this view 
recommends that governments exit from bank ownership and lift restrictions on the 
determination of interest rates; instead government efforts should restrict itself towards 
providing a stable macroeconomic framework, enhancing creditor rights, upgrading 
prudential regulation, and promoting the expansion of reliable debtor information 
systems (e.g. through credit bureaus).  
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The authors3 argue that a new intermediate viewpoint is emerging that favors direct well 
designed pro-market government interventions, to meet market failures and accelerate 
the passage to a developed financial market. This view argues that markets can and do 
broaden access to finance and therefore the adequate role of the government is to 
promote the development of deep and efficient financial markets, not to replace them. 
This view favors specific cost-effective government interventions, but argues that 
careful analyses to identify market failures and specify their causes should precede 
them. Interventions should designed so as to complement or facilitate market 
development through an adequate selection of instruments (e.g. subsidies or funding) 
and appropriate intervening institutions (e.g. NGO’s or public banks).  
 
The document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyzes the recommendations of 
multilateral organizations with regard to the application of public policies for the 
promotion of MF. Chapter 3 describes in detail the main initiatives developed by a 
representative group of South American countries (accounting for some 90% of MF 
loans granted) and conclusions are detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2. Best practices concerning public policies to broaden access to credit 
 
Governments play an important role in the development of financial systems designed 
to offer services to the poor, which in turn has an impact on the activities of the 
commercial banks and MFIs that provide them. Experience demonstrates that this role 
can be constructive in some cases but counterproductive in others. All in all, the 
discussion is not focused on whether governments must intervene or not, but on what 
they should and should not do considering the country specific context. Subsequently 
we introduce the best practices suggested by the multilateral agencies on the subject: 
 
 
2.1 United Nations  
 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted 2005 as the International Year of 
Microcredit to “address the constraints that exclude people from full participation in 
the financial sector.” Drawing on this mandate, the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs and the UN Capital Development Fund undertook a project to analyse the 
obstacles to financial inclusion and to report on efforts to overcome them in a variety of 
countries4.  
As a result of this collective effort the United Nations published in 2006 a book called 
“Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development”, also known as the “Blue 
Book”5. By describing the policy framework and public sector role in inclusive finance 
it discusses the roles expected of public sector and private sector stakeholders in 
bringing about an inclusive financial sector. The main points emphasized are the 
following6: 
 
- Existence of a coherent policy framework:  
The documents highlights the need of a clear articulation of how the social policy 
objective of outreach and the financial policy objective of stability should interact with 
and balance each other. Political focus on short-term expediency can undo years of 
development efforts, create significant frustration among various stakeholders and 
seriously impede long-term efforts toward financial inclusion. 
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- Interest rate liberalization: 
It can be politically appealing and expedient to “protect the poor” by re-imposing 
interest rate caps, although these caps usually have negative consequences for market 
development. The difficulty is that interest rate ceilings, by making it impossible to 
cover costs, undermine the ability of many microfinance institutions to become 
sustainable, with the result of forcing many poor people to rely on much more 
expensive and limited informal alternatives. At the same time, legitimate concerns are 
expressed that high interest rates may reduce profitable business opportunities for the 
poor, and they may reduce their ability to accumulate assets. High interest rates may 
also lead inexperienced or financially unsophisticated poor or low-income borrowers 
into debt traps.  
 
- Government involvement in financial intermediation: 
A large body of evidence suggests that direct government lending to poor people has 
not always been effective or achieved stated governmental objectives, based on negative 
experiences in many countries and particularly due to a defective risk management of 
direct credit to small customers. Yet, there are also some examples of successful 
experiences (BRI in Indonesia, BancoEstado in Chile, or Financiera Rural of México) 
and emphasis is put in their potential to attend rural finance, which has renewed the 
interest on the subject.  In general, state-owned financial institutions have been more 
successful in offering savings to poor people than in managing the risks associated with 
credit services. In any case, publicly owned banks and other state-owned financial 
institutions are the major providers of financial services to the poor people in 
developing countries. Governments sometimes mandate commercial financial 
institutions to allocate a percentage of their lending to certain economic sectors or to the 
less advantaged segments of society in an effort to broaden access. Directed lending 
programmes were applied in many countries in a way that distorted market signals and 
did not achieve intended purposes. Recently, some better-designed programmes have 
resulted in increased commercial bank involvement in finance for micro, small and 
medium enterprises.  
 
- The role of subsidies and taxation: 
Although some concerns exist regarding on how subsidies applied without the necessary 
transparency and care may distort the market, favouring the provision of inefficient 
services and without reaching the target population, subsidies can help to pursue social 
objectives and to correct for “market failures.” There is a tendency towards “smart” 
subsidies reflecting the concept of maximizing social benefits and incentives for strong 
institutional performance while minimizing distortions and mistargeting7. Many 
countries expressed concerns about important differences in how tax regulations are 
applied to different financial institutions and the lack of appropriate fiscal incentives. 
 
- Policies to broaden and strengthen financial infrastructure 
Financial infrastructure covers the range of support mechanisms provided by the public 
and private sectors to promote financial market development, competition and access of 
the poor to financial services.The existence of a credit bureaux, an effective property 
registry and the functioning and adequacy of the legal and judicial system play a key 
role in reducing credit risk.Key issues to enhance financial sector transparency and 
accountability include proper consumer protection laws, accounting standards, and the 
provision of ratings performed by specialized, neutral and internationally recognized 
agencies. An important factor to reduce costs includes primarily clearing and 
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settlements systems able to process an increasing number of transactions. The 
parameters of these systems need to be such that smaller financial institutions can 
benefit directly or through linkages with larger financial institutions. Also the exchange 
of information between institutions should be promoted. 
 
 
2.2  Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
 
CGAP is an independent policy and research centre, housed at the World Bank, 
dedicated to advancing financial access for the world's poor. It is supported by over 30 
development agencies and private foundations8 who share a common mission to 
alleviate poverty. CGAP is a necessary reference in issues concerning MF and during 
2004 it developed the following principles that were endorsed by 31 member donors, 
the Group of Eight leaders and numerous emerging markets governments. Some of 
them are closely linked to suggestions of public policies and are therefore reproduced 
next9:  
CGAP Principles 
1. Poor people need a variety of financial services, not just loans. In addition to credit, they want savings, 
insurance, and money transfer services. 
2. MF is a powerful tool to fight poverty. Poor households use financial services to raise income, build 
their assets, and cushion themselves against external shocks. 
3. MF means building financial systems that serve the poor. MF will reach its full potential only if it is 
integrated into a country’s mainstream financial system. 
4. MF can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to reach very large numbers of poor people. Unless MF 
providers charge enough to cover their costs, they will always be limited by the scarce and uncertain 
supply of subsidies from governments and donors. 
5. MF is about building permanent local financial institutions that can attract domestic deposits, recycle 
them into loans, and provide other financial services. 
6. Microcredit is not always the answer. Other kinds of support may work better for people who are so 
destitute that they are without income or means of repayment.         
7. Interest rate ceilings hurt poor people by making it harder for them to get credit. Making many small 
loans costs more than making a few large ones. Interest rate ceilings prevent MF institutions from 
covering their costs, and thereby choke off the supply of credit for poor people. 
8. The job of government is to enable financial services, not to provide them directly. Governments can 
almost never do a good job of lending, but they can set a supporting policy environment. 
 
During 2006 CGAP published a document called “Access for all”10, reflecting the 
collective experience gathered during the last 10 years. Chapter 5 is devoted to the role 
of governments in the build-up of an inclusive financial system. It is stated that a 
consensus holds on the important role goverments play in ensuring favorable policy 
environments within which microfinance can flourish. A good policy environment 
allows a range of financial service providers to coexist and compete to offer higher-
quality and lower-cost services to large numbers of poor clients. Although, this 
heightened interest by governments in microfinance brings opportunities and risks. 
  
Governments typically get involved in the financial system in at least three ways: 
 
• Delivering financial services directly and indirectly,  
• by setting policies that affect the financial system, 
• by proactively promoting inclusion. 
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- Direct and indirect financial services provision:  
Financial services may be channelled directly through state-owned banks and other 
credit schemes operated by government entities, and indirectly through wholesale funds.  
Government credit schemes for the poor are usually heavily subsidized, so they are 
vulnerable to political patronage, and usually show high levels of non-performing loans. 
Low interest rates in government programs mean that lending institutions cannot cover 
their costs and thus require continuous government or donor subsidies to survive. 
Financial services may also be provided by state-banks, in which case full operational 
separation and autonomy from the rest of the bank operations, no political influence on 
lending policies and freedom to set loan interest rates are prerequisites for success. As 
in Government credit schemes, Governments often channel funding through wholesale-
level funds that pass those resources along to retail financial institutions. These funds, 
sometimes called “second-tier” funds, are often subject to political pressures and are 
usually subsidized. Those funds that are more successful tend to be the ones in which 
governments play a less important role in governance and management, and in which 
funds are offered at market or near-market rates. 
 
- Policy Environment  
Governments have an important role to play in setting policies that allow sustainable 
financial services for the poor to flourish. There are at least three types of policies that 
governments need to get right11: 
 
• macroeconomic stability, 
• liberalized interest rates, and 
• appropriate banking regulations and supervisory practices. 
 
Regarding macroeconomic stability the document states that probably the most 
important single thing that governments can do to facilitate microfinance is to make 
sure inflation remains low. Inflation erodes the capital base of financial institutions; 
makes it difficult to mobilize resources, especially savings. Concerning maximum 
interest rates the documents repeats the ideas exposed in principle 7 of CGAP.    
On the subject of appropriate banking regulations, as MF matures, it will likely migrate 
toward institutions that are licensed and supervised by the central bank and other 
financial authorities. For those financial institutions that capture deposits from the 
public some standard banking regulations need to be adjusted to accommodate 
microfinance, whereas non-deposit taking IMFs shouldn’t be subject to prudential 
regulation.   
In what refers supervisory practices the costliness and difficulty of effective prudential 
supervision, especially for smaller institutions, is a particularly thorny policy issue.  
Another risk is that specialized microfinance laws, especially when they specify a 
particular institutional type, may end up marginalizing microfinance rather than 
integrating it within the financial system. Financial services for the poor stand a better 
chance of growing when larger financial institutions, including commercial banks, get 
involved. 
 
- Proactive Government Promotion 
Governments, especially in developed countries, have used incentives to proactively 
entice or force financial institutions to serve those excluded from accessing financial 
services. There appear to be at least four models of government promotion to consider:  
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• priority sector lending or mandated minimum banking services,  
• regulatory incentives,  
• payment of government benefits through bank accounts, and 
• matching deposits12. 
 
The document concludes that the role of government in building inclusive financial 
systems is crucial but nuanced because there is a tension among the different roles that 
governments play. Some microfinance experts and many developing country officials 
increasingly concur that the government’s best role is to offer a policy environment that 
allows competitive and diverse financial service providers to flourish. The key actions 
for governments are to maintain macroeconomic stability, to avoid interest rate caps, 
and to refrain from distorting the market with unsustainable, subsidized, high-
delinquency loan programs. Governments can also adjust banking sector regulation and 
supervision to facilitate microfinance while also protecting poor people’s deposits. 
understood. It also appears that governments might play a useful promotion role, by 
employing the proper incentives. 
 
Regardless of the way governments engage in MF, it is well understood that its 
involvement has a positive role to play in building inclusive financial systems. The 
challenge ahead is to convince governments to take on this constructive and powerful 
responsibility and to avoid repeating approaches that have failed in the past. 
 
 
3. Public policies for the development of MF in South America 
 
In several countries where the activity of commercial banks in MF is significant, or has 
been on the increase in recent years, the State has been seen to take a role in the 
implementation of policies and regulations. Experiences registered range from 
regulatory frameworks favorable to the development of MFIs and concrete incentives, 
through to mandatory requirements for financial institutions to become involved in the 
MF business. Below is a summary of some of these experiences, with a description of 
legal and regulatory frameworks, public policies for the encouraging of MFIs, and the 
institutions carrying them out. Also included is a description of the development of the 
MF market, and its relationship to the legal and regulatory frameworks and the policies 
implemented. 
 
 
3.1. Argentina  
 
In Argentina financial intermediation institutions are regulated by the Central Bank of 
Argentina (BCRA). Although the regulatory framework does not contemplate a 
particular category for institutions dedicated exclusively to MF, there are regulations 
designed specifically to cover financial services for low-income individuals13. There are 
various mechanisms that enable institutions to carry out such operations, depending on 
the most structure they consider most suitable: they can grant microloans, finance MFIs 
or set up companies specifically dedicated to microfinance business. In addition credit 
cooperative unions (CCC) also have specific regulation to involve themselves in MF. 
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- Microloans 
Under the category of microloans, banks can channel loans to microenterprises making 
use of origination and monitoring methodologies commonly used in the industry, which 
are information intensive and rely on in-situ monitoring of customers. These loans 
target low-income individuals seeking to finance their production, commercial and 
service activities. In addition, such loans may be granted for training and housing 
improvement. Microentrepreneurs can also receive loans for the purchase of goods or 
services for consumption. There is no cap on microloan interest rates, and the maximum 
amount that can be granted is $ 15,000 (approximately USD 4,30014). Repayment 
installments for these loans are determined on the basis of the business cycle of each 
individual entrepreneur. The financial institution can originate these loans directly, or 
via an MFI. The microloan portfolio can reach up to 30% of the regulatory capital.    
 
- Financing of MFIs 
Loans granted to MFIs are channeled through a system designed for such transactions, 
facilitating the role of financial institutions as “second tier banks”. These loans are 
excluded from regulations limiting the amount of any loan to be granted to the capital of 
applicants, MFIs in this case, which makes sure that financial institutions can fund MFIs 
without major restrictions.  
 
- Complementary service companies 
Financial institutions can participate in the capital of subsidiaries created by them that 
have as their main activity the granting of loans to microentrepreneurs, based on the 
complementary activities allowed by regulations. Loans granted through such 
companies have the same features as those mentioned earlier. To grant loans, service 
companies may use own funds, loans, donations or other forms of contributions.  Such 
companies can operate as loan originators on behalf of the shareholding financial 
institution, or for other institutions within the financial system. 
 
- Credit cooperative unions (CCC)  
MFIs can take part as CCC associates, with a larger share than that corresponding to 
other legal persons15. Each MFI can subscribe to between 3% and 10% of the capital of 
a CCC, depending on the level of banking use in the jurisdiction within which the head 
office is located. The aim is to encourage greater participation by MFIs in those zones 
with lower financial service coverage. Furthermore, CCCs can also grant loans to 
microentrepreneurs with the same features indicated previously, for a maximum amount 
of $ 10,000 (approximately USD 2,87016).  
 
Other measures adopted by the BCRA oriented to develop an inclusive financial system, 
include the set up of special branches, exception to the mandatory reserve requirement 
on financing from abroad and savings accounts. 
 
- Mobile branches 
To provide customer attention points, regulations allow financial institutions to set up 
“temporary customer attention offices” in locations where there are no branches of 
financial institutions.17 These bureaus can perform the same operations as traditional 
branches, enabling them to reach segments of the population that include potential 
microfinance customers who for either cultural or geographical reasons have been 
unable to approach traditional bank branches. 
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- Exception to the mandatory reserve requirement on financing from abroad  
In 2005 the Executive Branch18 established a requirement for a one-year unremunerated 
time deposit for 30% of certain types of capital inflow. As a result of this measure, 
financing from abroad intended for MFIs was obliged to comply with the requirement, 
increasing the cost of foreign funding. The Central Bank, which was empowered to 
regulate the measure, eliminated this restriction on funding intended for MFIs set up as 
foundations and civil associations19. This measure exempted not-for-profit MFIs, while 
those legally incorporated as commercial companies remained subject to the reserve 
requirement. In view of the difficulties encountered by the sector, in 2008 the Central 
Bank took further steps to expand the range of MFIs exempt from the 30% reserve 
requirement20.  
 
- Basic savings account 
Argentine regulations also established facilities for the providing of savings services by 
means of a basic account21. The holders of these accounts should be individuals 
authorized to freely perform transactions, with funds generated by licit activities. This 
product can be offered by first-tier commercial banks, finance companies, cooperative 
credit associations and savings and housing loan associations. To open such an account 
it is necessary to provide proof of identity and confirmation of tax status22. These 
accounts, in local currency only, offer a series of transactions without charge to their 
holders, withdrawals from the ATMs of the account-holding institution, direct debit of 
store purchases, debits for funds transfers, etc.. Nevertheless, the rule does allow banks 
to make maintenance charges, and charges for movements in excess of those laid down.    
  
 
Regarding public policies to promote MF, several initiatives can be mentioned, 
including second tier funding programs, public bank’s involvement, and the existence of 
a Microloan Law.    
 
- Social capital Fund (FONCAP) 
State programs in support of MF included the creation in 1997 of the FONCAP, 
conceived as a corporation, which administers a fund originally consisting of a 
contribution from the federal government. Its mission consists in allocating money to 
fund microfinance institutions, so that it is a “second-tier” organization. In compliance 
with its objectives, it channels towards MFs public funds such as those from the Social 
Capital Trust Fund and funds from international cooperation agencies such as the one 
set up by the Government of Italy together with the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), which it manages in its capacity as trustee.  
 
- Guarantee Fund of Buenos Aires (FOGABA) 
FOGABA was set up as a private company with the Buenos Aires Goverment as its 
major shareholder. Created in 1994, as an initiative of the Buenos Aires goverment23, it 
offers guarantees to facilitate credit access for different beneficiaries located in the 
province of Buenos Aires. Microentrepreneurs are possible targets of these guarantees, 
that are channeled under the scheme of “guaranties for the net of MF”. They are offered 
to the microentrepreneurs through the interaction of FOGABA with IMFs. 
 
- Microloan Law  
The Law on the Promotion of Microcredit24 introduced in 2006 created a program that 
has at its disposal a new fund to support MFI activities. The aim of the law is to 
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promote and regulate microcredit to stimulate overall development of the population, 
low-income groups and the institutional strengthening of not-for-profit civil society 
institutions that collaborate in the carrying out of social policies. This law defined 
various MF-related concepts: 
 
• Microloans: These are loans to finance the activity of undertakings by 
individuals or groups in the social economy for an amount not exceeding the 
equivalent to twelve minimum wages. 
• Microloan beneficiaries: Low-income individuals or associations organized on a 
self-employment basis in the framework of the social economy that carry out 
manufactured goods production, provide jobs for the disabled, or sell goods and 
services, whether urban or rural, in productive units possessing total assets that 
do not exceed fifty basic total baskets for an adult in a standard household, a 
figure that is to be updated by the National Institute of Statistics and Census 
(INDEC), per job position.    
• Microcredit Institutions: Not-for-profit associations (civil associations, 
cooperatives, mutual welfare entities, foundations, indigenous communities 
government and mixed participation organizations) granting microcredit and 
providing training and technical assistance to social economy undertakings. 
 
As mentioned above, the law created the “Program for the Promotion of Microcredit for 
the Development of the Social Economy” within the sphere of the Ministry of Social 
Development. The objectives of this program include:    
 
• Promotion of the development of microcredit and strengthening Institutions 
implementing it by means of the assigning of non-reimbursable resources, loans, 
guarantees, technical assistance and training. 
• Organization of a Nation Register of Microcredit Institutions (responsible for 
procedures for registration and control of the member institutions for the 
purposes of the law).  
• Administration of the National Fund for the Promotion of Microcredit created 
under this law, promoting the gaining of public and private sector resources.  
 
The Fund, totaling $ 100 million (approximately USD 28.7 million25) will be used to 
capitalize microcredit institutions adhering to the scheme by means of the allocation of 
non-reimbursable allocations, loans and guarantees. Interest rates, operating costs and 
technical assistance costs incurred by microcredit institutions will be subsidized in part 
or in full. In addition, the law exempted microcredit operations channeled with funds 
from this program from income tax, minimum notional income tax and value-added tax.     
 
 
Participation by the public sector also includes the providing of financial services 
through three public institutions:    
 
- Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (BAPRO) acts as a second-tier bank through the 
Fuerza Solidaria program. Fuerza Solidaria is an initiative of the Government of the 
Province of Buenos Aires, Banco Provincia and the National Lottery and Casino 
Institute (Instituto Provincial de Lotería y Casinos), the main purpose of which is to 
provide financial and technical assistance to those sectors lacking access to the formal 
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credit system. Through one of its financing programs it grants loans to microcredit 
institutions. Such institutions should have been in operation for at least two years and be 
active within the province of Buenos Aires. They can obtain amounts of up to $ 1.5 
million (approximately USD 430,200) at a subsidized interest rate.    
 
- Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires 
Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires entered this market as a second-tier bank through 
the “Ciudad Microfinanzas” program, granting preferential financing to MFIs located in 
the city of Buenos Aires. Banco Ciudad makes available to MFIs a credit line for the 
granting of microloans for up to $ 3,000 (approximately USD 860) and terms of up to 
18 months, to finance new or existing undertakings in the areas of manufacturing, 
services and commerce, targeting self-employed entrepreneurs of legal age, groups or 
work cooperatives and community organizations, the business of which take or will take 
place mainly within the sphere of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Loans to MFIs 
can amount to up to $ 200,000 (approximately USD 57,000).  
 
- Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA) 
BNA established the National Fund for the Creation and Consolidation of 
Microundertakings (Fondo Nacional para la Creación y Consolidación de 
Microemprendimientos - FOMICRO) in 2004, coordinated by the BNA with the SME 
Under-Secretariat. FOMICRO works with microcredit institutions, but these only 
participate in the selection, presentation and training for MF projects to be financed, the 
decision on whether to grant the loan being taken by the bank. The program operates on 
the basis of personal guarantees for the financing of productive (non-commerce) 
undertakings, interest rates being subsidized by the SME Under-Secretariat and the 
National Ministry of Economy and Production26. Subsequently, another trust was set up 
(FONDER) to provide financial and technical assistance on an intermediate scale for 
regional development purposes. Regarding public policies to promote MF, several 
initiatives can be mentioned, including second tier funding programs, public bank’s 
involvement, and the existence of a Microloan Law.    
 
 
The microfinance market in Argentina is at an incipient stage. Although in recent years 
the topic has gained increased relevance, and the offer of microfinance services has 
expanded, there is still a wide gap between supply and demand. According to an 
estimate made in 2006, the potential demand for microcredit in the Buenos Aires urban 
area alone would total 440,000 workers27, whereas the sector provided financing to 
some 40,000 customers nationwide. 
 
Table 1: Data on MF in Argentina – in USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on RADIM, UNDP Project (information at December 2008) and others. These totals are 
understated, as there is no data on smaller MFIs.    
 
MFIs Gross loan portfolio
Average loan 
balance
Active 
customers
Credit 
advisors
MFIs members of RADIM 21.731.962 676 32.138 205
Other MFIs 5.081.342 617 8.231 70
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In Argentina most MFIs are incorporated as NGOs or unregulated corporations (SA); so 
far there are no financial institutions regulated by the Central Bank dedicated 
exclusively to MF. The universe of institutions and programs is varied, although there is 
heavy concentration around those entities gathered together in the Argentine 
Microfinance Network (Red Argentina de Microfinanzas - RADIM)28. Those in the 
form of Sociedades Anónimas (SA) hold the largest share of the market29 (by number of 
customers and portfolio amount) although there is a larger number of NGOs.   
 
As well as the activity by public banks, other commercial banks have made incursions 
into the market, or have plans to enter into the world of MF. In 2006 Banco Columbia 
established a strategic alliance with Acción Internacional to develop a microfinance 
service branch under the name of “Columbia Microcréditos SA”. Banco Supervielle, 
with the advice of PlanetFinance, created a company called “Cordial Microfinanzas 
S.A.” to serve the sector, and opened its first branch at the beginning of 2007. In 2006 
Banco Hipotecario decided to channel its microfinance industry efforts through the 
Fundación Pro Mujer, operating in the region of Salta and Jujuy. In 2007 Banco 
Santander Río developed the first stage of its Microcredit Program, focusing on MFIs 
organized as NGOs. By means of soft loans it seeks to benefit those microentrepreneurs 
financed by such NGOs. These are just some of the projects that the private bank sector 
has made public recently. 
  
 
3.2. Bolivia 
 
The Bolivian MF market is nowadays considered as one of the most developed in the 
world, not only for the outreach and number of MFIs but also for its regulatory 
framework and institutional development.30 However 25 years ago this market, which 
today is characterized by a high participation of regulated financial entities, was in its 
infancy. 
 
During the 80’s Bolivia, as well as other countries in Latin America, had worked under 
an economic model mainly characterized by governmental intervention and the presence 
of the public sector in the financial system. This situation changed dramatically in 
Bolivia since August 1985 when a series of reforms were implemented to start a New 
Economic Policy putting an end to direct governmental intervention in the economy. 
The liberalization process established in that year is the most important antecedent that 
paved the way for the development of MF in Bolivia.31 The reforms included unifying 
the exchange rate, eliminating price controls, liberalizing the entire financial system, 
and imposing strict monetary and fiscal policies that drastically reduced inflation32. In 
1987 more measures were adopted that could be considered as setting the stage for a 
robust microfinance industry: 
 
- Liberalization of interest rates 
- Closure of 4 state banks and subsequently weak private banks33. 
- Adoption of a universal banking system. 
- Reduction of the legal reserves required on deposits. 
- Authorization for financial institutions to accept deposits in foreign currency. 
- Increased autonomy of the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions 
(SBEF) from political pressure. 
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The closure of the state banks, until then the main credit providers for small-scale 
producers, resulted in the proliferation of private, non-profit institutions that offered 
credit to small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs unable to access the formal financial 
system. The international aid received during that time also contributed to the 
proliferation of NGOs that tried to fill the space left by public sector in the satisfaction 
of the basic needs of the population and poverty alleviation.34 Before 1980 there were 
100 NGOs in Bolivia, but during the 1980-1992 period this number increased to 530.35  
 
Some of the currently most famous MFIs in Bolivia initiated their operations as NGOs 
during that period: PRODEM (Fundación para la Promoción y el Desarrollo de la 
Microempresa), FIE (Centro de Fomento a Iniciativas Económicas), Pro-Crédito (later 
Caja Los Andes-FFP), FADES (Fundación para Alternativas de Desarrollo) and 
AgroCapital.  
 
Table 2: First MFIs in Bolivia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Private Financial Funds (FFP) 
In 1983 Law No. 1,488 (called Law of Banks and Financial Entities) created the 
Superintendence of Banks and Financial Entities, replacing the previous one created in 
1928 by the Banking Act.36 Even though the word microfinance or microcredit was not 
mentioned in this new law it represented a turning point for the microfinance industry. 
Non Banking Financial Institutions were included under the scope of the law and these 
were taken to include Credit Unions, Mutual Societies and, under the category Other 
Non Banking Financial Institutions, FFP and Private Institutions for Social 
Development.   
 
Although the FFP were mentioned as non-banking entities to be regulated, these funds 
did not exist at that time and the law did not define the rules for the regulation and 
supervision of those institutions. With the opening provided by the law, however, 
NGOs began to pressure the SBEF to create the regulatory framework for their 
incorporation into the formal financial system. Efforts toward incorporating 
microfinance activities within the formal financial framework had begun in 1991 when 
PRODEM approached the SBEF with a project for the creation of BancoSol, a bank 
intended to serve the microentrepreneur exclusively.37 
In 1995 the Supreme Decree No. 24,000 authorized the creation of the FFPs as 
corporations (non-banking financial institutions) specialized in intermediating funds to 
small borrowers and microentrepreneurs, allowing the major NGOs targeting that 
NGO Year of incorporation Other comments
FIE 1985
FADES 1986
Its aim was to support and contribute to organizations, 
cooperatives, associations and small groups of rural 
and urban sectors through microcredit.
PRODEM 1987 In 1992 founded BancoSolidario SA, the first MF commercial bank.
PROCREDIT 1992 Nowadays Banco Los Andes Pro-credit
AgroCapital 1992 Created through the joint efforts of the Bolivian government and USAID.
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segment to meet their objectives by setting up risk-capital corporations, authorized to 
attract deposits and subject to financial authority controls (by the SBEF). The initial 
capital requirement applicable for these non-banking institutions was approximately 
USD 940,000, whereas for banks it was USD 8.2 million. The acknowledgement of the 
solidarity guarantees, coupled with a strict prudential framework that stipulates lower 
limits to grant credits and for credit concentration (3% of its total capital to one creditor 
and 20% if it is a financial institution) than those set for the banks, and the ban on 
granting loans to shareholders and management, is a reasonable combination of equity 
backing and dispersion of credit risks.38 
 
The first FFP created under the new law was Caja Los Andes S.A. FFP. Founded in 
1995 it was the result of the complete transfer of all financial activities from the NGO 
Association Pro-Crédito created originally in 1992.39 In 2005 Caja Los Andes FFP was 
transformed into a commercial bank 100% dedicated to MF (Banco Los Andes 
ProCredit), and is the best example of a complete upscaling process in the MF industry. 
 
Others followed soon: FIE FFP was created by the NGO FIE, Bolivian private investors 
and the Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development in early 1998. Also, the SBEF 
approved the incorporation of Eco-Futuro (in 1998) and PRODEM (in 2000) as FFP. 
Although the figure of FFP was originally conceived as the vehicle through which those 
successful microfinance NGOs could enter into the formal financial system, the SBEF 
approved the incorporation of FASSIL-FFP (1996) and ACCESO-FFP (1997) that were 
not previous NGOs but had been founded by private investors. The most recent 
incorporation is Fortaleza FFP, part of Grupo Fortaleza40, which started operation in 
2002. 
 
The FFP market can be defined as a stable one based on the number of institutions that 
were founded since the FFP law’s sanction and those still operating today. From the 8 
FFP acting in Bolivia in 2002 (the highest number of active FFP ever seen) only two 
were transformed and ended their operations as FFPs: Caja Los Andes FFP changed its 
legal status and is now a commercial bank and ACCESO FFP changed its legal form to 
provide loan recovery services as a non regulated entity. 
 
- Banking regulation of MF41 
In recent years the SBEF has adjusted its regulations to market conditions and the 
characteristics of the MF sector. As a result, financial regulations set special rules for 
incorporation and operation of microfinance-oriented institutions, such as FFPs and 
Savings and Loan Cooperatives. In addition to including these two types of financial 
intermediation specifically targeting microfinance within the scope of its supervision, 
the SBEF contemplates the voluntary and unrestricted performance of microcredit 
activities by all the entities that it regulates.  
 
Regulations define microcredits as all loans granted to borrowers, whether natural or 
legal persons, or a group of borrowers with joint or several guarantees, intended to 
finance small-scale manufacturing, commercial, service or other activities, the main 
sources of repayment being the product of the sales and revenue generated from such 
activities, which have been duly verified.42  
 
In the case of portfolio classification rules and the provision requirements for loan 
losses, a special treatment exists for microcredits.  The classification of microcredit 
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debtors is made according to the days in arrears with obligations, and a specific 
provision must be ser up on the basis of that classification. The number of days in 
arrears considered is closely linked to the type of activity they finance: small 
undertakings with very short economic cycles.43  
 
Table 3: Provisions for MF in Bolivia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBEF. 
 
A second risk component covered by regulations makes it possible to measure credit 
risk on risk additional to delinquency, bearing in mind compliance with credit policy, 
the existence of adequate credit technology and the evaluation of the potential risk 
arising from riskier borrowing by customers from other institutions.  
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the specific provision regime, regulations require generic 
provisions for microcredits based on evaluation of the policies, practices and procedures 
for the granting and administration of loans and control of credit risk, which should 
include the existence of adequate credit technology, policies for the handling of 
refinancing agreements and the existence of information technology systems and 
procedures for the monitoring of the rescheduled portfolio. If it should be determined 
that the policies and practices followed are not in line with minimum regulatory 
guidelines, the institution will be required to set up a generic provision for 3% of its 
total microcredit portfolio. 
 
Based on a representative statistical sample of debtors and after a detailed review of its 
contents, the frequency of deviations from the established credit policies is determined.- 
Generic provisions of 1% for each 10% deviations are established. 44 
 
On the road to adoption of the Basel II standards, Bolivia’s SBEF is temporarily 
implementing debtor classification based on the internal appraisal methods carried out 
by the institutions themselves, which must be approved by the regulatory authority. 
Until these standards are fully implemented (in 2010, according to the transition 
schedule45), banks will continue to classify risk using the days in arrears system 
mentioned previously.   
 
A third provisioning component also applicable to microcredits was introduced in 2008: 
generic cyclical provisioning. This has been created to avoid underestimating risk at 
times when the economic cycle is on the rise, so that coverage is provided for 
unidentified losses on those loans where the deterioration has not yet materialized.46 
Institutions are required to set up an additional 1.6% provision on their microcredit 
portfolio classified as category A. This cyclical provision is in addition to any specific 
provision requirement.   
 
Days in arrears - # 
Refinancing
Credit 
assesment
% of 
provisions
1 - 5 A 1
6 - 30 B 5
31 - 60 D 20
61 - 90 F 50
> than 90 H 100
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To encourage the geographical spread of services, procedures for the opening of 
agencies and branches to provide MF services have been simplified, and include 
specific regulations covering the providing of mobile services, a tool allowing 
microfinance institutions to offer greater coverage, in view of the geographical 
dispersion that exists in the country.    
 
In a similar manner, regulations were established for auxiliary financial service 
correspondent agreements, authorizing regulated financial intermediaries to enter into 
them among themselves, as well as with unregulated institutions in order for them to 
perform financial payment and transfer services, obviously except for the receipt of 
deposits and the placing of loans.47 
 
In addition, specific regulations have been issued for the opening of Credit Information 
Bureaus48, so that microfinance institutions supervised  by the SBEF can gain access to 
credit information provided by unregulated microfinance institutions, which can in turn 
obtain information on consumer loans and microloans granted by the regulated financial 
system (this has endowed MFs in Bolivia with greater transparency and has provided 
more precise information on the over-borrowing that has affected this industry in recent 
years, which has arisen as one of the main lessons of the Bolivian experience).    
 
Again as part of the drive towards market transparency, the Regulation on interest 
rates49 sets the characteristics and minimum content for loan contracts, seeking to 
reduce the asymmetry in information that exists between financial institutions and small 
customers, generating greater transparency for lending activities. 
 
Under the same regulations, in addition to the interest rates charged, institutions are also 
required to publicly post details of all the commissions and charges included in any loan 
transaction. This information must also be made available at the time loans are being 
proposed, so that customers are in a position to compare the various financing 
alternatives. This principally favors microentrepreneurs who have no experience in 
financial matters. 
 
Another regulation of particular relevance to MFs is that for the Customer Complaints 
Attention Service50 which provides financial service customers the possibility of 
making any type of complaint or consultation directly to the financial institutions, which 
are responsible for replying to their customers within set times, after which the 
complaints or consultations are transferred to the SBEF for appropriate handling. This 
mechanism enables the SBEF to take preventive and corrective measures, as well as to 
promote equity and transparency in relations between institutions, customers and users.  
 
- New rules for the regulation of NGOs  
During 2008 there have been a series of changes made to financial regulations intended 
to ensure that almost all financial institutions fall under the regulation of the SBEF51. 
They include closed cooperatives, know known as societies, and Financial Institutions 
for Development (IFDs)52. The latter are NGOs that will continue to be organized as 
foundations or not-for-profit associations or civil associations.  Unlike FFPs, IFDs cover 
the microfinance market in the areas of greatest poverty, and in some cases where there 
are problems with access and communication.53 These changes in regulation will have a 
significant impact on the national financial system in the medium term, as they will 
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enable IFDs to take deposits, which is something that they could only do by means of 
Financial Intermediation Mandates with regulated institutions.  
 
One highly important feature of current regulations is that they do not prohibit non-
financial activities, in other words, they do not consider that IFDs should be exclusively 
financial intermediation institutions, and consequently, they only lay down that 
activities not involving financial intermediation should be booked in memorandum 
accounts (this is of vital importance for IFDs carrying out a large number of training 
activities and warrants, leasing and other different forms of credit business).    
 
 
The IFDs that will begin to form part of the regulated system belong to FINRURAL 
(Association for Financial Institutions for Rural Development) a civil not-for-profit 
association that has been working in Bolivia since 1993, grouping together not-for-
profit MFIs and contributing to improvement in their institutional performance, the 
diversification and quality of their services, and the strengthening of their image.54  
 
In the last 4 years these IFDs have been applying a self-regulation system that follows 
the same guidelines as those applied by the SBEF, in preparation for joining the 
regulated system (either with their own regulations adapted to their specific 
characteristics, or by incorporating them within one of the already existing structures).  
Since its beginnings, the Self-Regulation System was conceived as a transitory process 
for institutional preparation and strengthening that in the medium term (2004-2007) 
would allow the participating MFIs to become integrated within the state regulatory 
system, acting in national and international markets demonstrating stability, solvency 
and transparency.55 
 
With a single exception, IFDs have the required minimum capital under the new 
regulations, and all of them plan to fully comply with the regulations to be able to take 
in deposits within 18 months56. According to a recent survey, they have pointed out the 
great help that self-regulation has meant; at present FINRURAL continues to provide 
training in matters of software purchases, technology and the flow of information to be 
submitted to the SBEF.57 
 
- Government role in MF   
Since the restructuring of the financial system described, including the closure of public 
banks after 1985, the Bolivian financial system has been mainly characterized by the 
existence of private owned banks. The MF market has followed this same pattern, so 
that the government is an indirect player in the MF industry.  
 
Despite this passive role, the government has accompanied the development of the MF 
sector through the implementation of policies and regulations that contributed to the 
expansion of a healthy market. Furthermore, the international aid received by Bolivia 
under international cooperation agreements, always remarked on as one of the factors 
that contributed to the development of MF in Bolivia, on many occasions has been 
channeled through the government. 
 
Currently there are two government programs that support MF markets, Banco de 
Desarrollo Productivo, a second tier bank, within the financial system, and FONDESIF, 
a development fund, outside the financial system.  
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Additionally to those two already existing institutions there have been other 
governmental attempts to support the expansion of MF sector through development 
institutions providing financial and technical support to MFIs. In 1998 there were three 
public funds working in Bolivia with funds from international cooperation agencies and 
the national government: the Rural Development Fund (Fondo de Desarrollo 
Campesino), Regional Development Fund (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional) and 
Santa Cruz Development Finance House (Financiera de Desarrollo Santa Cruz S.A.M). 
The last two did not directly deal with MFIs; FDC was created in 1999 to encourage 
agricultural development through loans and grants to MFIs focusing on rural areas and 
regulated by the SBEF.58 The three institutions discontinued operations between 2001 
and 2002.    
 
- Banco de Desarrollo Productivo (BDP) 
This is a second tier bank conceived as a commercial corporation regulated by SBEF 
that promotes development activities through loan granting. The bank started its 
operations in 2007 with a total capital of USD 60 million, 80% from the Bolivian 
government and 20% from the Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina 
de Fomento - CAF). The new bank was created within the National Development Plan 
(Plan Nacional de Desarrollo)59 framework for the creation of a development bank to 
promote national income redistribution through the financing of rural and urban 
productive sector that were traditionally excluded from other financing sources.60 As of 
May 2008 (its first 12 months of operations) the bank had disbursed 7,200 loans for a 
total of approximately USD 80 million (using 2007-2008 average exchange rate).61   
 
- Nacional Financiera Boliviana (NAFIBO) 
BDP, created in 2007, is a transformation of another semi-public financial institution 
called Nacional Financiera Boliviana S.A.M (NAFIBO) that had operated in the country 
since 199662. NAFIBO had the same equity structure as BDP and had financed MFIs 
regulated by the SBEF. During its 10 years of work it had received financial and 
technical support from several international organizations such as the IDB and KFW 
that has described the bank as a private institution that succeeded to work apart from 
governmental pressures and political interventions. 63   
 
NAFIBO showed good results in terms of loan disbursement, reaching a peak in 2004 
when it managed 9.5% of total financial system active portfolio. At the end of 2006 it 
held USD 181 million in direct loans to financial institutions.64   
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Chart 1: Evolution of NAFIBO Portfolio Vs. Total System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NAFIBO discontinued its operations at the beginning of 2007 through the supreme 
Decree 28,999 that ruled its institutional adjustment in order to be transformed in a 
development bank.65 BDP continued with NAFIBO operations adding new financing 
operations allowed by its new legal figure (for example act as a fiduciary body in the 
financing of infrastructure projects).   
 
- FONDESIF 
The Financial System Development and Support to Productive Sector Fund (Fondo de 
Desarrollo del Sistema Financiero y de Apoyo al Sector Productivo - FONDESIF) was 
created in 1995 as a nonprofit organization under the Ministry of Economy. 
Restructured in 1999 to act as a conduit for the Microcredit Fund66, it evolved into a 
second tier institution to finance MFIs and today is under the control of Ministry of 
Development.67  
 
FONDESIF is the arm of the government that provides financing and technical support 
to MFIs, whether or not regulated by the SBEF. As in the case of NAFIBO, FONDESIF 
channeled governmental resources as well as those from international cooperation 
agencies from countries such as Canada, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, Germany and 
Denmark. As of December 2007, more than half of its portfolio was financed by 
international organizations. Its active loans amounted to USD 73.5 million (USD 35.8 
million from international organizations), with a portfolio at risk of 6.33% and the 
technical assistance portfolio was USD 13.2 million with USD 8.4 million from 
international aid. 68  
 
FONDESIF selects sustainable MFIs and provides financing to expand its geographical 
outreach to those regions excluded from financial services, or to consolidate its presence 
in geographical areas with a high potential demand. Financial resources are provided to 
finance the opening of new branches or to support those already existing through loans 
and subordinated obligations. Additionally, it provides resources to promote the study 
and development of the sector through the execution of market research, technical 
papers, workshops and seminars. 
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The same Decree that established NAFIBO’s conversion into a development bank 
(BDP) at the beginning of 2007 stated that FONDESIF will be gradually dissolved. The 
BDP will be the organization in charge of that dissolution having the obligation to 
perform an external audit as well as a technical and legal evaluation of FONDESI assets 
and resources in order to determine which of them will be transferred to BDP 
administration. In the meantime, FONDESIF cannot enter in new business similar to 
that performed by BDP and can only pursue those businesses that are essential to 
continue with its administration.69 
 
 
By the end of 200870 there were 6 FFPs, 12 commercial banks (two of them specialized 
in MF: BancoSol and Banco Los Andes), 24 Savings and Loan Cooperatives and 8 
Saving and Loan Mutual Companies active in the Bolivian regulated financial system. 
Among the institutions waiting for incorporation to SBEF regulation (under the new 
law) there were 46 Saving and Loan Cooperatives (Societarias) and 13 Development 
Financial Institutions.    
 
The chart below shows the participation in total deposits and loans per group of 
institution as of August 2008. Under the label Others (not regulated) are included those 
commercial institutions that mainly grant consumer, housing and pledge-backed loans.     
 
Table 4: Financial system snapshot (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of the total number of banking institution customers, 230,000 belong to BancoSol 
and Banco Los Andes, the two banks with the highest number of customers in the 
banking system. Taking into account the total customers of FFPs, the two MF banks and 
IFDs, we are close to determining the total number of customers in the Bolivian MF 
market: 775,416. Doing the same exercise, the MF market has a loan portfolio of USD 
1.45 billion with an average loan of approximately USD 1,850 and total deposits for 
USD 1.02 billion. The mutual company sector has a higher average loan than the total 
system as it manages 5% of total loans with only 1.7% of the customers; on the contrary 
the IFDs have the lowest average loan, at USD 909.     
 
 
Since their creation FFPs have shown a significant share of the MF sector in terms of 
loans and total deposits, also recording a good performance in terms of profitability and 
risk indicators. The negative results for the 1999-2000 period, shown in Table 5, were 
mainly caused by high administrative costs that FFPs were facing as they entered the 
market at that time71.  
 
 
Non Regulated
Banks FFP Open Coop. Mutuals
Coop. 
(Societarias) IFDs Others
Total 
System
Total Loans (US$' 000) 3.611.680       580.395      308.982   260.332    194.315       268.204    22.596              5.246.504   
Participation 68,8% 11,1% 5,9% 5,0% 3,7% 5,1% 0,4%
Total Deposits (US$' 000) 5.335.589       500.045      318.021   404.052    6.557.708   
Number of Clients 401.091          250.665      81.246     18.685      60.802         294.751    21.171              1.128.411   
Participation 35,5% 22,2% 7,2% 1,7% 5,4% 26,1% 1,9%
Source: PROFIN. As of August 2008.
To be RegulatedRegulated
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Table 5: Private Financial Funds (FFP) 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of FFP 4 5 (a) 6(b) 7 (c) 7 8 (d) 8 7 (e) 6 (f) 6 6 6
Number of branches NA 43 46 102 105 122 135 148 150 170 190 231
Total Assets 135,3  193,2  149,5  158,4  176,5  224,8  289,8  385,3  321,9  431,0  581,6  853,7  
Total Loans 126,0  172,7  120,0  135,0  148,1  187,8  238,7  316,7  258,3  325,3  445,0  666,1  
Total Public Deposits 97,8    132,1  86,3    72,1    88,2    127,6  167,5  215,3  179,8  249,7  364,9  543,6  
Total Capital 18,1    29,1    27,2    29,8    27,0    31,2    35,0    40,9    33,7    42,5    57,8    87,9    
ROA 3,75% 1,89% -0,30% -1,89% -1,52% 0,26% 1,52% 1,63% 1,71% 1,56% 1,70% 1,20%
ROE 27,98% 12,52% -1,66%-10,08% -9,04% 1,83% 11,94% 14,86% 16,61% 15,77% 17,44% 11,94%
Portfolio at Risk 14% 13% 15% 10% 8,5% 7,2% 4,2% 2,6% 2,1% 1,8% 1,0% 0,9%
Number of Employees NA NA NA NA 1.186  1.264  1.768  2.104  1.785  2.559  3.009  3.810  
Figures in millions of USD as of December of each year
 
 
Notes: 
Number of Branches includes Provincial and Urban Agencies and Branches. Total Loans include Active 
Loans, Past Due Loans and Non Performing Loans. Capital includes Reserves, Accumulated Results and 
Equity. Portfolio at Risk Ratio is calculated as Past Due Loans and Non Performing Loans over Total 
Loans. ROA and ROE for 1997 to 2000 were estimated from agregated financial statements, from 2001 to 
2008 are those published by SBEF in Financial Indicators Evolution Bolletin. 
(a) In 1998 ACCESO was incorporated as a FFP 
(b) In 1999 is incorporated Eco Fondo FFP 
(c) In 2000 PRODEM is incorporated as a FFP 
(d) In 2002 Fortaleza is incorporated as a FFP 
(e) FFP ACCESO changes its legal structure and was out of SBEF regulation in 2004. 
(f) In 2005 Caja Los Andes FFP received its commercial bank license. 
NA: data non available 
Source: Own construction based on SBEF data. 
 
The evolution of the loan portfolio during the last 8 years has not been homogeneous 
across all groups of financial institutions. The economic slowdown that has 
characterized the Bolivian economy since the end of the nineties to 2004 had mostly 
affected the banking system, which reduced its total loans by USD 2 billion between 
December 1998 and June 2004. Savings and Loan mutual companies had experienced a 
similar decline, while the MF industry loans (including those of BancoSol, FFPs and 
IFDs) grew from USD 191 million to USD 410 million in the same period. 
 
As can be concluded from chart 2, the financial system as a whole experienced a change 
in its tendency in 2004. FFPs and cooperatives on the contrary have shown a positive 
trend for total loans for the entire period considered, despite the low growth by the 
Bolivian economy. The mutual company system showed a constant decline mainly 
explained by the decrease of the three biggest institutions (that could eventually end 
their operations). 
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Chart 2: Evolution of Total Gross Loan Portfolio per Group of Entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBEF 
 
 
3.3. Brazil 
 
The Brazilian Financial System is organized under the authority of the National 
Monetary Council (CMN) as the regulatory organ, responsible for formulating monetary 
and credit policy with the aim of preserving monetary stability and the country’s 
economic and social development. The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) is responsible for 
the supervision of financial institutions and is the principal executor of the guidelines 
established by the CMN.  
 
Following government policy directives, the CMN and the BCB have adopted various 
measures to facilitate access to the financial system by people with low incomes, mainly 
based on three pillars: credit cooperatives, microcredit, and non-bank correspondents.    
 
- Cooperatives 
Credit cooperatives have a lengthy history within the Brazilian economy.  They began 
to operate in 1902, and since 196472 they have been regulated by the BCB. In 200273 the 
setting up of cooperatives by microentrepreneurs was authorized74 carrying out 
industrial, commercial, rural or service activities, recording gross annual income for 
each association equal to or less than the limit established in current legislation for 
small companies. Subsequently, approval was given to the creation of credit 
cooperatives with unrestricted admission75.  
 
- Microcredit 
The first law issued to regulate microcredit operations was directed at the activities 
performed by NGOs. Law 9.79076 allowed NGOs offering microcredit to operate under 
the legal framework of Public Interest Civil Society Organizations (OSCIP), expanding 
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their operational scope to enable not only access to public resources but also to allow 
the use of “Association Agreements”77. Later, various regulations were issued 
establishing general guidelines for the carrying out of such activities. In 2001 OSCIPs 
and those credit associations for which the corporate purpose was exclusively the 
granting of financing to microentrepreneurs were excluded from usury regulations78.  
 
That same year a specific window was introduced to include MFIs within the financial 
system under the heading of Microentrepreneur Credit-Granting Associations (SCM)79. 
This legal format was designed so that MFIs might achieve sustainability solely by 
means of the offering of financial services. Their exclusive social purpose was defined 
as the granting of loans to individuals and microenterprises to facilitate small-scale 
undertakings of a professional, commercial or industrial nature. SCMs require BCB 
approval, and the BCB is responsible for their supervision. Among other faculties, 
SCMs are allowed to be transformed into other types of financial institution, they can 
assign loans with or without recourse, and set up Microcredit Attention Points. 
Activities they are forbidden to perform include the taking of deposits from the public 
and the granting of consumer loans. For SCMs to be able to reach into the poorer 
sectors of the population, OSCIPs were allowed to become parent companies of SCMs, 
as in general the latter seek out microcredit niches offering greater profitability. In 2003 
they were allowed to enter into contracts with non-banking correspondents80 (see 
below) to expand the scope of their operations. Subsequently, by means of the law that 
created the National Program of Oriented Productive Microcredit (PNMPO)81, SCMs 
were authorized to provide other financial services in addition to lending. This same law 
included SCMs among those oriented productive microcredit agencies qualifying for the 
program.   
 
- Non-banking correspondents 
In Brazil, the funds remittance business is quite significant. In view of the country’s size 
and the lack of branches in various regions, the BCB authorized various financial 
institutions82 to contract the services of non-banking correspondents to provide the 
following services, among others:  
 
• Receipt and processing of sight, term and savings account applications,   
• Receive deposits and make payments in relation to such accounts,   
• Receive and process requests for loans and credit,  
• Perform credit analysis and background checks on customers.  
 
In addition to the measures mentioned, the BCB adopted other initiatives to stimulate 
microfinance activity, including authorization of the opening of simplified accounts and 
the directing of sight deposits.  
 
- Simplified accounts 
In 2003 regulations83 were issued covering the opening of special deposit accounts for 
the low income sector of the population. These accounts may be held by individuals 
with no other accounts within the financial system. All that is required for them to be 
opened is an identity document and registration on a customer database84; the balance of 
such accounts cannot exceed R$ 1,000 (USD 43085) at any given moment.  
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- Directing of deposits  
In 2003 the Brazilian government86 granted the CMN the power to regulate the MF 
operations performed by certain financial institutions using resources derived from sight 
account deposits. Among other aspects, it was resolved that it should regulate on the 
lendable percentage of such deposits, the criteria for classifying individuals and 
microentrepreneurs, the criteria for selecting low income customers, the maximum 
interest rate for borrowers, the maximum charge for opening the credit file and the 
maximum amount to be lent to any one individual. The BCB87 established that a 
minimum of 2% of sight deposits taken by commercial banks, multiple-service banks 
with commercial portfolios and the Caixa Económica Federal should be allocated to 
microcredit operations. These operations are subject to the following conditions: 
 
• Microcredit operations are to be targeted at : 
o Individuals holding deposit accounts with monthly average balances of less 
than 1,000 reais (USD 43088),  
o individuals with small-sized enterprises of a professional, commercial or 
industrial nature,  
o legal entities classified as microenterprises based on current legislation,  
o low-income people with or without low value deposits,  
o individuals or legal entities undertaking small-sized productive activities 
with a gross annual income not higher than 60,000 reais (USD 25,70089).  
• The effective interest rate charged shall not exceed 2% per month (or 4% for 
transactions covered by the National Program of Oriented Productive Microcredit).  
• Maximum amounts:  
o Low income customers and holders of deposits for less than R$ 1,000 (USD 
430): R$ 600 (USD 255)  
o Microundertakings: R$ 1,500 (USD 640) 
o Productive microcredit: R$ 5,000 (USD 2,140).  
• Term: over 120 days.  
• Opening fee: from 1 to 4% depending on the type of loan.  
• Guarantees: joint and several guarantees from at least three individuals; guarantee 
bond; other guarantees accepted by financial institutions.  
 
Financial institutions can use various different instruments to comply with the 
requirements detailed, such as the transfer of resources to other financial institutions –
including SCMs-, the purchase of loans from other financial institutions (OSCIP, NGOs 
with bylaws contemplating the entering into of microfinance operations, and 
institutions, funds or programs created for microcredit purposes).   
 
- National Program of Oriented Productive Microcredit (PNMPO) 
In 2004, the federal government set up the PNMPO90 with the purpose of promoting a 
permanent flow of resources among microcredit institutions, banks and other operators 
using public resources. To this end, a special deposit line was made available from the 
Workers Assistance Fund (FAT)91 (for R$ 200 million, USD 85.5 million92), to which 
was added an allocation of 2% of the sight deposits as mentioned above. This ensured 
microcredit organizations had a significant and permanent source of resources on the 
condition that they cannot be lent at an interest rate of more than 4% per month.93 
Institutions require authorization from the Ministry of Labor and Employment to be 
able to participate in this program.  
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When detailing the development of MF activity in Brazil, mention should be made of 
the participation by the government through three public banks: Banco do Nordeste, as 
a first-tier bank, Banco do Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) as a second-
tier institution, and the Banco do Brasil subsidiary. 
 
- Banco do Nordeste 
Banco do Nordeste94 is a state-owned first-tier bank operating as a regional 
development bank in the north-east of Brazil, where the greatest concentration of 
poverty can be found. Together with Acción Internacional, in 1997 a microcredit 
program known as CREDIAMIGO95 was designed. With the aim of executing the 
CREDIAMIGO program and train customers, in 2003 Banco do Nordeste signed an 
agreement with the Instituto Nordeste Cidadania (INEC)96. As a result of this 
partnership, CREDIAMIGO acts as a first-tier bank and the INEC performs the 
operating procedures and the administration of human resources. The bank is 
responsible for loan approval, defining goals, and strategies for the training of loan 
officers, as well as the methodological procedures, providing information systems, 
furniture and equipment and publishing institutional advertising campaigns. The INEC 
is responsible for submitting credit proposals to the bank for their final approval, 
customer assistance and the selection, hiring and training of loan officers and 
customers. The credit risk of the loans granted under the CREDIAMIGO system is 
borne by Banco do Nordeste. The main funding sources for the program are lines from 
Banco do Nordeste. Other resources are provided by the FAT program and the 
redirecting of deposits as mentioned above. CREDIAMIGO only deals with the 
granting of loans, as it does not contemplate any deposit-taking from 
microentrepreneurs. The program’s main product is the “popular solidarity working 
capital,” the principal feature of which is its monthly 2% interest rate, to which a 
commission is added.  
 
- Banco do Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) 
The BNDES is a second-tier state bank that as part of its social development policies 
offers programs to expand the availability of productive credit to low-income 
entrepreneurs through the funding of MFIs. Until 2003 it channeled its operations 
through the Popular Productive Credit Program, whereby 32 microcredit institutions 
were supported with a total amount of R$ 43.3 million (USD 15 million97). In 2004 the 
BNDES Micro Credit Program was set up (PMC), with the aim of contributing with the 
operating aspects of the PNMPO. Some aspects were simplified, such as the acceptance 
of assets generated by the credit portfolio of agents transferring funds in guarantee of 
transactions. Another feature was the carrying out of transactions with funds 
transmission agents accredited as BNDES financial agents98. The latter transfer 
resources to agents operating directly with microentrepreneurs and that do not have 
sufficient weight to gain access to the PMC directly. In addition, in 2006 an agreement 
was signed between the BNDES and the Ministry of Labor and Employment for 
execution of the Institutional Development Plan for the PNMPO. The priority actions 
established included the training of OSCIP staff and the employees of microcredit 
institutions, and the spread of successful MPO methodologies.   
 
- Banco Popular do Brasil (BPB)99 
The BPB is a subsidiary of Banco do Brasil, an institution controlled by the government 
of Brazil that is listed on the stock exchange. In 2003, within the context of public 
policies that encouraged the increased use of banking and a more democratic 
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availability of financial services, the BPB was established to achieve the inclusion 
within the banking system of the lower-income sector of the population. It began to 
operate in 2004. The BPB acts through non-banking correspondents, as it has no 
branches, which enables it to cut costs and reach certain communities where the setting 
up of branches would be unlikely to be viable. As part of its product range, the BPB 
offers the possibility of access to microcredit and provides its customers with life 
insurance. Furthermore, the BPB holds interests in OSCIP associations.      
 
As a result of the laws and other measures implemented,100 in Brazil there are different 
microcredit modalities that can be summarized as follows:   
 
1. Not-for-profit institutions:  
• NGOs and provincial and municipal Public Funds (people’s banks) 
subject to maximum interest rates.   
• OSCIP (unrestricted interest rates).  
2. For-profit institutions: 
• SCM  
• Financial institutions operating directly, including through the adoption 
of a specialized department or portfolio.   
 
As mentioned above, the government participates in the sector, developing specialized 
institutions such as the BNDES, BPB and some development agencies, and through 
official banks with specialized portfolios, such as is the case of the Crediamigo program 
operated by Banco del Nordeste.  
 
The Brazilian microcredit market has grown significantly in recent years. Nevertheless, 
there is still a wide gap between the supply and demand for these services. On the 
demand side, a study by the BCB101 estimates that there are some 16 million small 
productive units, of which 7 million would be potential customers representing effective 
demand that translates into some R$ 12.0 billion (USD 5.5 billion102). On the supply 
side, including microenterprise credit cooperatives, at December 2006 there were 
around   220 institutions serving approximately one million active customers who had 
borrowed approximately R$ 1.0 billion (USD 470 million103), barely 9% of that 
demand. The largest individual operator continues to be Banco do Nordeste, through the 
Crediamigo program. 
 
Figures on the following table confirm the significance of participation by the 
traditional financial system for MF growth, because of their great capacity for 
generating funding in the short term.   
 
Table 6: Composition of Microcredit Offer (December 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tipo Institutions Customers Average loan amount (USD mill) (5)
Total amount 
(USD mill) (5)
SCMs(1) 56 21.286 1.047 22
Ongs, Oscips and public funds (2) 136 89.997 321 25
Crediamigo 1 235.729 338 80
Microentrepreneur cooperatives 23 33.672 2.027 68
Private banks (3) 4 ND 786 34
Targeted resources (4) - 714.075 383 281
Total 220 1.094.758 817 509
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1  Considering an average of 380 customers per SCM, calculated from sampling. 
2  Data from Nichter (2002) corrected for the variation in GDP 
3  Mean value calculated on the basis of estimates in "La demanda de microcrédito" (2002), p. 78-96 
4  2% of sight deposits taken by several types of financial institution, except credit cooperatives, applied 
as per the terms of Law 10.735/2003 
5  Selling dollar-real exchange rate at 12/29/2006. 
Source: SBS (2007) 
 
As a result of the policy adopted in relation to non-banking correspondents, in 2006 
there were over 95 thousand customer attention points established, five times more than 
the number of branches. In addition, it should be noted that 37% of the companies in the 
informal sector with up to five employees made payments by means of non-banking 
correspondents. 
 
Table 7: Correspondents – Basic Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Year-end balance, except payments and receipts, for which the figure represents the sum of 
transactions for the year. At the dollar-real exchange rate at the end of December of each year. 
Source: BCB (2007) 
 
Information provided by the BCB104 on sight account for low-income customers reveals 
that over half the simplified accounts were opened at the Caixa Económica Federal105 
(over 3 million), at the Banco Popular de Brasil (1.5 million) and at Banco do Brasil 
(approximately one million). 
  
Table 8: Number of Special Accounts Opened 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Recording movement in the last six months.  
Source: BCB (2007) 
 
On the matter of the allocation of deposits, since the introduction of the law until 
August 2008 microcredits granted never reached 100% of total resources available for 
application. The gap between the 2% of deposits requirement and its use for microcredit 
has been rising in the last three years, as can be seen from the following chart, and 
stands at 50%. Use of these resources is split between consumer credit and loans for 
microentrepreneurs, with the amount granted to the latter always being lower than in the 
case of the former. Only a small proportion of resources is transferred to the SCMs and 
other non-financial institutions specializing in productive microcredit via interbank 
deposits linked to MF transactions (DIM).   
 
Consolidated 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002-2006
Attention points 74.267 78.539 83.396 90.424 95.234 28%
Transactions (1) 900 1.005 1.203 1.418 1.533 70%
Amount (USD mill) (1) 20 24 38 59 85 331%
Type of account Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 2004-2006
Simplified current account 4.021.095 6.292.622 6.792.625 69%
Simplified savings account 138.479 295.672 339.680 145%
Total simplified accounts 4.159.574 6.588.294 7.132.305 72%
Total active accounts (1) 3.976.345 4.676.106 4.818.138 21%
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Chart 3: Deposit Allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BCB www.bcb.gov.br 
 
In the case of PNMPO, the program started in 2006 with fifty authorized microcredit 
institutions, ending the period with an increase of 300%.    
 
Table 9: Authorized Institutions (April 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Operating financial institution (Institución Financiera Operadora - IFO) 
2 Development Agencies  
Source: BCB (2007) 
 
The Banco do Nordeste CREDIAMIGO program that began with a pilot scheme at five 
branches and expanded to 51 branches in only a year, is one of the world’s largest 
providers of microcredit services, with 400,000 active borrowers and an active portfolio 
of R$ 362 million (USD 155 million) as at December 2008. Customers forming the 
program’s loan portfolio are diverse. They are mostly owners of micro-undertakings 
active in the informal sector of the economy, with assets valued at between 
approximately USD 430 and USD 3,400106. Despite forming part of federal government 
policy, CREDIAMIGO is a sustainable program with a delinquency rate of 1.7%107 and 
an annual average rate of return on the portfolio of 8.99% (2007). Its productivity levels 
are also notable, reaching an average of 408 active customers per loan officer and 
attending to 3,312 customers per day.   
  
In the case of the performance by BNDES, the PMC portfolio established between 2004 
and 2006 reached a record operations level of R$ 80 million (USD 37.4 million108). Of 
the twenty institutions supported, four are second-tier agents that transfer resources to 
160 institutions operating directly with microentrepreneurs, thus widening the 
capillarity of the BNDES and improving access to the resource provided under the 
program. 
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3.4. Chile 
 
In Chile, institutions that combine lending activity with the taking of deposits from the 
public are subject to the supervision of the Superintendency of Banks and Financial 
Institutions (SBIF).  
 
In addition, all lending institutions, whether or not they take deposits from the public, 
are covered by a law that sets a cap on interest rates109. This limit is known as the 
agreed maximum rate and cannot exceed the current rate by more than 50%110.  
 
Rules covering authorized financial intermediaries establish a uniform regulatory 
treatment for all types of institution. On matters of requirements for their setting up, 
prudential rules and activities allowed, regulations do not differentiate institutions 
according to their type of lending (for treasury purposes, consumer loans, housing loans, 
microcredit, etc.). Nevertheless, regulations contemplate certain windows through 
which institutions can channel their MF transactions.  One of them is the creation of 
business units linked to banks.    
 
- Banking branch companies 
A reform of the banking law (in 1986) authorized the setting-up of financial 
consultancies structured as banking branch companies (sociedades filiales bancarias). 
These branches are able to advise on financial activities such as credit risk or market 
analysis and the evaluation of new businesses.  
 
- Savings and Loan Cooperatives 
Another channel made available to serve low-income members of the population is that 
of savings and loan cooperatives (cooperativas de ahorro y crédito - CAC). A recent 
change in legislation111 enabled a broader scope of authorized activities for “larger-size” 
CACs while at the same time introducing a more demanding supervisory mechanism112. 
CACs may grant loans to their members and the public in general, with or without 
security, and can carry out collections, payments and fund transfers. These institutions 
are supervised according to their size, with those with a net worth of less than 400,000 
“unidades de fomento” (USD 13.6 million113) being excluded from the control of the 
SBIF.  
 
Furthermore, the Chilean government has used various public agencies to promote 
initiatives for the providing of financial services to the lower-income segment of the 
population. Basically, measures consist of the providing of guarantees, operating cost 
subsidies or direct participation by means of the granting of microloans, such as those 
provided by BancoEstado.  
 
- Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS)  
FOSIS114 is a decentralized public agency with its own legal standing and net worth that 
was created in 1990 and comes under the supervision of the Planning Ministry. FOSIS 
finances development plans and programs contributing to a reduction of poverty in the 
country. Its activities include the subsidizing of part of the operating cost of small loans 
granted by financial institutions, thereby reducing the cost of such organizations.   
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- Agricultural Development Institute (INDAP)115  
The INDAP is a decentralized institution created in 1962 to support small farmer family 
agricultural activity. Its actions target farmers who work the land themselves and own 
assets of less than 3,500 UF (USD 96,000). The INDAP operates a rural microloan 
program that has as its aims the improvement of credit management and working 
capital, with emphasis on expansion of sources of funding for the support of innovation 
and investment processes. To this end, the Program for Working Capital for Productive 
Development was created to encourage financial institutions interested in developing 
loan platforms for small farmers. This program operates by means of the use of two 
instruments:   
 
 Working Capital Bond: This bond covers the increased transaction cost of  loans 
granted to small farmers. The bond is auctioned among those institutions that 
have previously signed an agreement to participate, and is awarded on a 
competitive basis. The incentive is paid once the awardee institution has granted 
the loan to the small farmer116.   
 Financial Administration Fund: This fund is designed to encourage the 
development of credit availability for small farmers through public and private 
banks and CACs. INDAP transfers resources to various institutions by means of 
private tenders so that they can be administered for a period of 5 years for the 
purpose of granting loans to small farmers.117  
 
- National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI)118 
CONADI119 is a public entity responsible for promoting, coordinating and executing 
public policy on indigenous affairs (its funds and programs being intended for the return 
of land and water rights, cultural reinforcement and the development of the indigenous 
population). One of the tools for the development of indigenous economic activities, in 
force since 2004, is a program developed together with municipalities for the 
implementation of MF systems.  
 
- Technical Cooperation Service (SERCOTEC)  
SERCOTEC is a corporation established under private law that administers and makes 
use of state funds, for which reason it is considered to be a state institution120. In 2008 
SERCOTEC signed an agreement with BancoEstado (a state bank) to promote use of 
banking services by small businesses121. The specific objectives of this program were to 
provide banking instruments for microentrepreneurs and the promotion of access to 
private sources of finance, as well as the increased use of banking services by micro and 
small companies (MIPES). SERCOTEC is responsible for coordinating communication 
and publicizing of private financing, incorporating private financing to the content of a 
program for micro-business training, and presentation of micro-businesses and 
entrepreneurs to banks for financial evaluation when they are potentially in a position to 
opt for private co-financing for the adequate implementation of their undertaking or 
business. BancoEstado supports the introduction of MIPES to banking and finance by 
means of the issue of bank products that improve their internal administration and the 
financial structure of their businesses, among other tasks.  
 
- Guarantee Fund for Small Entrepreneurs (FOGAPE)  
FOGAPE is a state fund that was created in 1980 with the purpose of providing loan 
guarantees to banks lending to small businesses. FOGAPE is administered by 
BancoEstado and supervised by the SBIF. The loans guarantees are intended for 
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individuals or companies developing productive or service-sector business activities 
with an annual sales limit of UF 25,000 (USD 852,500122) in the case of non-
agricultural businesses, and up to UF 14,000 (USD 477,400) for small agricultural 
undertakings. To gain access to these loans, borrowers must be tax registered and have 
no unfavorable commercial history or unpaid debts. Loans must be used for purposes 
such as working capital or investment projects. Guarantees are offered by means of 
public tenders held by BancoEstado and can cover up to 80% of the loan, so that the 
banks share some of the risk of default. Bids are selected on the basis of the coverage 
required, until the entire amount being tendered has been allocated. Banks recording a 
high default rate for these guaranteed loans may be excluded from the tender process. 
FOGAPE charges banks a commission of up to 2% of the guaranteed loan based on 
each bank’s loss record. Commissions and other revenue, such as yield on investments, 
are used to cover all the administrative costs and losses so that FOGAPE is able to 
operate on a sustainable basis. 
 
- BancoEstado  
BancoEstado began its microfinance activities in 1995 through BancoEstado 
Microempresas (BEME). BEME is a separate entity from the bank, having been 
established as a financial advisory subsidiary as allowed by regulations. By acting in 
this manner, BEME achieves autonomy for the development of its loan-granting 
activities. At the same time, BEME can make use of the bank’s infrastructure through 
its branch network. In addition, on the matter of funding, BancoEstado has a 
considerable number of savings accounts, enabling the planning of significant growth in 
the microcredit portfolio without major restrictions.   
 
 
MF in Chile was initially carried out through microloan organizations, private 
institutions and NGOs. These organizations arose to provide support for small-sized 
service and commercial production initiatives that developed as a result of the economic 
crisis in the 80s. During the 90s the state adopted a more active role, beginning to 
participate via different channels as mentioned above.   
 
Of the 1.339.000 microenterprises in Chile, 28% receive specialized credit coverage 
(broken down as shown on Chart 4) of which 61%  are attended to via specialized 
banking divisions and CACs, and the remaining 39% via other specialized providers  
(INDAP, NGOs, Foundations and other CACs). Some 34% of microenterprises with 
coverage are informally-established companies, while their participation in the micro-
business universe is 57%.  
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Chart 4: Specialized Microenterprise Loan Coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBIF (2007) 
 
On the supply side, there are three financial institutions and four CACs, supervised by 
the SBIF, providing MF services. Although there are other players in the sector, they do 
not specialize in this type of business. The offer includes savings, loan, cash 
management and insurance products.  
 
In recent years, the portfolios of specialized banking subsidiaries have expanded 
considerably (Chart 5). In the case of the CACs, the rate of growth is significant, 
although this activity is performed on a much smaller scale.    
 
Chart 5: Microenterprise Loan Portfolio Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBIF (2007) 
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The dynamism shown by certain public sector programs indicates that the FOGAPE 
guarantee system has had considerable success. The default rate on guarantees granted 
has been relatively low, totaling 1.05% in the second half of 2005. This figure would 
suggest that this offer of guarantees does not provoke any reduction in bank follow-up 
and monitoring of their portfolios123. In 2007, 17 financial institutions participated in 
the system, for a total of 24,000 operations for an amount of guaranteed loans in excess 
of 13 million U.F. (approximately USD 440 million). 
 
Official bank BancoEstado carries out these operations through its subsidiary BEME, 
with a customer portfolio that accounts for approximately 50% of the market124. BEME 
has 163 contact points for microenterprises along the entire length of Chile. Its loans 
record low delinquency levels (1.3% in 2006), a figure comparable with that for the 
leading MF banks in the region125. Other notable performance-related features include a 
high ratio of customers per loan executive (600 each) and rising profits (at the end of 
2006 profits were 75 times higher than in 2001).  
 
In addition to BancoEstado, other banks that have ventured into the world of MF are 
Banefe (Banco Santander) working in the field since 1993 and Banco del Desarrollo, 
where such activities began in 1991. Both BancoEstado and Banco del Desarrollo 
conduct their microfinance operations through subsidiaries. Banco del Desarrollo does 
so through Bandesarrollo Microempresas Asesoría Financiera de Interés Social S.A. 
This subsidiary places and monitors bank-owned microloans and receives a commission 
from the bank in exchange for the placement126  
 
On the matter of the maximum interest rate, some authors127 indicate that they have not 
been able to find evidence of it acting as a restriction on the financing of 
microenterprises128 as many of the transactions involving microenterprises during the 
evaluation period were entered into at below the so-called current interest rate.  
 
 
3.5. Colombia 
 
The Colombian financial system falls under the supervision of the Colombian Financial 
Superintendency (SFC), which since 2005129 oversees financial, stock exchange and 
insurance activities and any other business involving the taking of deposits from the 
public. Although intermediation establishments are classified according to their 
nature130, there is no specific category for MFIs. Anyway, regulation establishes that 
commercial financial companies may perform microcredit operations with loans they 
receive from other financial intermediaries131.  
 
The public sector has ventured into the MF industry via a wide and varied range of 
initiatives that established clear definitions for the sector, encouraged the offering of 
savings and loan services from the private sector and developed training programs, 
among other aspects.     
 
- National Program for Microenterprise Development  
The first public sector initiatives took place in 1994 with the creation of the National 
Program for Microbusiness Development. This program, established to support the 
microenterprise sector, was based on several strategies:   
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• Technical, commercial and financial training.  
• Recapitalization of the National Fund for Guarantees (FNG) for the granting of 
guarantee certificates to people unable to obtain traditional guarantees, and 
support for cooperatives, associations and financial foundations so they could 
obtain loans as intermediaries.  
• Creation of the Finurbano program, set up by the Industrial Development 
Institute (IFI) to grant rediscounts to financial institutions and direct lending to 
savings and loan cooperatives, foundations and not-for-profit associations, 
among others. IFI funds are obtained on capital markets, as it is not provided 
with resources by the national Budget.  
 
- “Mipyme” Law 
The following step was taken by means of the Mipyme (Micro and Small Business) 
Law132, the aim of which was to promote the development of micro, small and mid-
sized companies. The law laid down several definitions in relation to MF:  
 
• Microenterprise: Defined as a business with not more than 10 workers and total 
assets (excluding home) of less than 500 monthly minimum wages (USD 
112,000 as at January 2009)133.  
• Microcredit system: A system for financing microenterprises by means of loans 
for less than 25 minimum wages (USD 5,600 as at January 2009). 
 
In addition, financial intermediaries and organizations specializing in microenterprise 
lending were authorized by the High Council of Microenterprises to charge 
commissions and fees. Fees were set to remunerate technical advice and in-situ visits, 
while commissions were to pay for analysis of the credit transaction and its collection, 
among other matters. This authorization for the charging of fees and commissions was 
due to the policy for the setting of interest rate caps,134 currently determined by the 
Financial Superintendency. These charges are not considered as interest for the purposes 
of the terms of Colombian legislation on financial transactions135.  
 
- Agreement between Banks and Government 
In 2002 the public and the private sectors agreed on an initiative to provide an impulse 
to the development of MF. The federal government and 31 banking institutions signed 
an agreement whereby the latter undertook to allocate $ 300,000 million (USD 135 
million136 as at January 2009, or USD 105 million as at December 2002) of their own 
resources for the granting of loans to microenterprises during the first year.  
Subsequently, through to 2006, credit lines were to grow by at least the increase in the 
previous year’s consumer price index.  
 
- Real Estate Microcredit 
In 2003 a new microcredit model was created with the aim of financing housing for 
microentrepreneurs. Law 795 created the real estate microcredit for the purchase, 
construction or improvement of property, with the following features: 
 
• The loan should be for less than 25 minimum wages (USD 5,600 as at January 
2009), for a maximum term of 5 years, and at a rate equal to that established for 
the financing of public housing.   
• The value of the property should be no higher than 135 minimum wages (USD 
30,200 as at January 2009).  
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The law also authorized the charging of a commission to remunerate analysis of the 
credit transaction and its collection cost, among other items. These charges are not 
considered as interest for the purposes of the terms of Colombian legislation on 
financial transactions 137.  
 
- Entrepreneurial Culture 
Subsequently, a law was passed in 2006138 to assist in the development of an 
entrepreneurial culture that also proposed the entering into of agreements with financial 
institutions so that the business plans of new entrepreneurs could serve as a guarantee 
for the granting of loans.  
 
- Banca de las Oportunidades 
That same year, a document from the National Economic and Social Policy Council  
formed the basis for the creation of an investment program known as the Opportunity 
Bank (Banca de las Oportunidades)139, administered by Banco de Comercio Exterior de 
Colombia, Bancoldex. The aim of this program is to facilitate access to financial 
services for low-income families, entrepreneurs, and micro, small and medium-sized 
companies. The Opportunity Bank network is made up of banks, commercial finance 
companies, cooperatives, NGOs and family welfare associations. Its activities range 
from proposing regulatory framework reforms to eliminate restrictions, designing 
incentives to promote access to financial services, and developing programs of financial 
education and technical assistance for cooperatives and NGOs, among others.   
 
- Interest Rate Certification  
Also in 2006, a decree was issued140 requiring the certification of the various types of 
bank interest according to the type of loan. This laid down the following definitions: 
 
• Microcredit: Loans granted to microenterprises for a maximum amount of 25 
minimum wages (USD 5,600 as at January 2009).  
• Microenterprise: A legal or natural person with not more than 10 workers or 
whose assets (excluding home) total less than 500 minimum wages (USD 
112,000 as at January 2009).  
 
This certification is applicable to those institutions regulated by the SFC and the entities 
supervised by the Superintendency of the Solidarity Economy141 authorized to perform 
financial activities or grant loans. This decree was modified on two occasions (2007 and 
2008) establishing a new definition of microcredit: 
 
• Microcredits: Operations defined in the credit systems142 and loans granted to 
microenterprises for which the principal source of payment comes from revenue 
derived from the business. The amount of indebtedness within the system as a 
whole should not be higher than 120 minimum wages (USD 26,800 as at 
January 2009), excluding mortgage loans for housing.  
 
- Non-Banking Correspondents 
Another of the measures adopted in 2006143 was targeted at the providing of services 
through non-banking correspondents, defined as physical or legal persons providing 
attention to customers. Correspondents can carry out the following activities, among 
others: 
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• Receipt and transfer of funds 
• Remittances in Colombian currency within the country  
• Deposits and withdrawals from current accounts, savings accounts or term 
deposits.  
• Disbursements and payments in relation to loan transactions.   
• Collection and handing out of documentation on the services provided.  
 
- Exemption from tax on financial transactions  
To encourage the use of banks for savings purposes, the tax on bank transactions was 
eliminated in the case of withdrawals from savings accounts held at financial 
institutions, financial cooperatives and savings and loan associations supervised by the 
Solidarity Economy Financial Superintendency144 in the case of monthly amounts up to 
a total of 350 UVT145 (USD 3,700 as at January 2009). 
 
- Fees and commissions 
In 2007, Resolution 01 issued by the High Council for Microenterprises set a cap on 
fees and commissions that could be charged as per Law 590 sect. 39 indicated above. 
The following amounts were laid down: 
   
• Loans for less than 4 minimum wages: 7.5% p.a.  
• Loans for 4 minimum wages or more: 4.5% p.a. 
 
- Savings accounts 
In 2008, Decree 1119 authorized credit institutions and cooperatives to offer accounts 
and savings plans for small amounts at no cost to the beneficiaries. These accounts and 
plans have the following features:  
 
• Savings accounts:  
o Limits: Deposits for up to a maximum of 2 minimum wages per month.  
o Monthly balance up to 3 minimum wages   
• Savings plans: 
o Deposits for up to a maximum of 2 minimum wages per month.  
o Annual balance up to 4 minimum wages  
o Balance at the end of the contract of up to 16 minimum wages  
• Includes 2 movements and one balance check per month 
• No minimum deposit requirement 
 
In addition, institutions were exempted from the requirement to make mandatory 
investments for the value of deposits under this system. To simplify the opening of 
these accounts as regards requirements for the prevention of money-laundering and the 
financing of terrorism, the Superintendency has established as a sole requirement that 
the customer should be duly identified.  
 
- Bancamía – Banco de las Microfinanzas 
One of the latest developments in the sector has been the setting up of the first 
specialized bank in this sector, known as Bancamía – Banco de las Microfinanzas. This 
bank arose from the merger of two NGOs (Corporación Mundial de la Mujer Colombia 
and Corporación Mundial de la Mujer Medellín) with a majority partner, Fundación 
BBVA, set up in 2007146. In October 2008 the Superintendency authorized Bancamía to 
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operate as the first banking establishment exclusively for the microenterprise sector147. 
The two NGOs mentioned had already been working in MF for some 20 years.     
 
In Colombia148 there are 1.6 million microenterprises149, of which 62% hold some kind 
of loan, and 41% of these loans come from informal sources150. Formal 
microenterprises151 tend to finance themselves more through banks and suppliers than 
informal microenterprises, which make more use of credit lines provided by 
foundations, and less frequently by means of pawnshops and commercial 
establishments. Loans from small lenders, friends, neighbors and relatives are used by 
both formal and informal microenterprises. The total amount of microenterprise credit is 
$5.7 billion pesos (USD 2.6 million as at August 2007), 20% of this amount coming 
from informal sources. This indicates that the amounts of informal loans are 
significantly smaller than those of formal loans. 
 
The following comments can be made regarding the outcome of public policies in this 
area. The Finurbano program has run into various difficulties in lending to 
microenterprises. Problems encountered have included the reduced participation in loan 
placement by regulated intermediaries, mainly because of the low familiarity with the 
microbusiness sector, the high administrative cost of such loans, and the lack of 
specialized risk-analysis units. In the case of unregulated intermediaries, mention 
should be made of the limited availability of guarantees and very low levels of net 
worth, which hinder access to credit. According to Andares (2007)152 public assistance 
via portfolio rediscounts is not much utilized by NGOs because the official guarantee 
demanded increases its cost. 
 
In the case of the Bank-Government Agreement, since it began (August 2002) through 
to the latest information available (August 2006), the program has significantly 
exceeded the targets that had been established (Chart 6). At the time the agreement was 
signed four banking institutions participated actively in this business. In 2005, almost 
20 commercial banks were lending to microenterprises.   
 
Chart 6: Compliance with Microcredit Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asobancaria based on figures from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism.  
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In June 2007 there were 1,658 non-banking correspondents, while the total as at 
November 2008 reached 4,870, of which more than 80% belonged to a single institution 
(Citibank).  
 
Regulated credit establishment microcredit portfolios evolved as follows: 
 
Chart 7: Microcredit Disbursements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera 
 
Among different credit establishments, banks are those who concentrate the most of 
microloans awarded (December 2008). 
 
Chart 8: market share of the microloan portfolio 
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Although no reliable data exist of all existing microloan providers, the latest figures 
(2003)153 would indicate that banks (public and private) are first in the ranking, 
followed by NGO’s and at last with a smaller share the CFCs.   
 
 
3.6. Ecuador 
 
The Financial system Institutions Act154 regulates the creation, organization, activities, 
operation and winding-up of private financial system institutions, as well as the 
organization and functions of the Superintendency of Banks (SBS).  Private financial 
institutions are defined as banks, finance companies and investment and development 
corporations, mutual savings and loan associations for housing, and savings and loan 
companies that carry out financial intermediation with the general public.  A minimum 
capital requirement of 9% of weighted assets and a basic capital amount of USD 
2,628,940 has been set for banks and USD 1,314,470 for finance companies and 
investment and development corporations. The SBS has the power to set the basic 
capital requirement for other types of financial institution.  
 
The Organic Law on Monetary Regime and State Bank determines Ecuador’s monetary 
regime, establishing that the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador -
BCE) is responsible for its execution. Section 22 lays down that the BCE Board is to 
determine, in a general manner, the interest rate system for lending and borrowing 
transactions, which will govern future transactions, having no retroactive effect.   
 
The Law for the Regulation of the Effective Maximum Cost of Credit was issued in 
June 2007, introducing the following reforms to the General Law on Financial System 
Institutions, which could have an impact on microfinance activity:   
 
- A Liquidity Fund is to be set up that is to be managed by a private trustee from 
Ecuador or abroad, selected by the private financial institutions and authorized by the 
Banking Committee. The Banking Committee will establish policies on financial system 
liquidity risk management in accordance with international best practices, and in 
particular on the basis of the Basel Committee recommendations. The Liquidity Fund 
shall be composed exclusively of contributions made by the private financial institutions 
themselves, and its resources shall not be able to be provided by the Government of 
Ecuador or any public sector institution155. 
 
- The rates to be charged by the financial institutions for their lending and borrowing 
services and any other services they may provide shall be freely agreed between the 
contracting parties and shall have as their maximum limit the system average per 
service plus two standard deviations, giving 95 percent confidence. The charging of fees 
for which there is no counterpart service is forbidden. Likewise, interest charges 
disguised as fees or rates are also forbidden. Fees and expenses must relate to services 
actually provided or expenses actually incurred. It shall not be possible to charge 
commissions or fees for services that have not been accepted or solicited by the 
customer. Should there be costs payable to third parties other than the lender, such as 
fees of expert appraisers, property registers, commercial registers, insurance premiums, 
these must be authorized previously by the borrower and detailed on the corresponding 
liquidation. There should be no charge for direct legal fees for the granting of the loan. 
It is forbidden for creditors to charge any type of commission on credit transactions. 
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Creditors are forbidden from collecting commissions or fees of any kind on any advance 
payment made by debtors when the interest rate is adjustable. 
- Natural or legal persons performing commercial activities that make sales on credit 
shall only be able to charge the effective rate for the consumer segment, plus taxes 
required by law, and shall in no case charge commissions or other additional items. 
Such interest shall not be able to exceed the effective maximum reference rate for the 
segment; should it do so, the natural persons responsible for setting and/or collecting 
such a rate shall incur the crime of usury. 
 
In December 2007156 the BCE made a significant modification to its Code of 
Regulations157, declaring the unconstitutionality of the reforms to the Organic Law on 
Monetary Regime and State Bank contained in the Law for the Regulation of the 
Effective Maximum Cost of Credit, introducing the following changes:   
 
It establishes the following credit segments: 
 
a) Commercial 
b) Consumer 
c) Microcredit 
d) Housing 
 
Microcredit is defined as all loans for not more than USD 20,000 granted to a borrower, 
whether incorporated as a natural or a legal person, recording annual sales of less than 
USD 100,000, a self-employed worker, or a group of borrowers with several guarantee, 
intended to finance small-scale manufacturing, sales or service activities for which the 
main source of repayment will be the proceeds of sales or the income generated by such 
activities, adequately verified by the financial system institution.   
 
In the case of natural persons without a wage, usually in the informal sector, for whom 
the principal source of repayment shall be the sales or income generated by the activities 
to be undertaken, regardless of whether the purpose of the loan is the financing of 
productive activities or for the purchase of goods for consumption or payment of 
services for personal use, the transaction shall be understood to be microcredit, and 
therefore the interest rate to be applied shall be that of any of the three existing 
microcredit segments.  
 
Self-employed workers are understood to be those who perform their activity making 
use only of their personal work; in other words, they do not depend from an employer, 
nor do they make use of waged workers, although they may be assisted by 
unremunerated family workers.    
 
In the case of microcredit transactions instrumented by means of community-type 
granting methodologies, the effective rate to be applied to these credit transactions shall 
not exceed the maximum rate for the segment to which the average individual amount 
received by each member of the group receiving the loan corresponds.  
 
For such operations, the BCE defines the following segments for microcredits158:    
 
Subsistence microcredit – Credit operations for amounts per transaction and 
amount due to the financial institution of USD 600 or less.  
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Simple accumulation microcredit - Credit operations for amounts per transaction 
and amount due in the form of microcredit to the financial institution that are 
higher than USD 600 and do not exceed USD 8,500. 
 
Extended accumulation microcredit – Credit transactions for amounts in excess 
of USD 8,500.  
 
For all the segments defined, maximum effective lending rates have been established 
corresponding to the average rate, weighted by amount of the credit transactions granted 
in each segment in the four weeks prior to the last full week of the month in which they 
will take effect, multiplied by a factor to be determined by the Board of the BCE. It is 
forbidden to charge a nominal interest rate if the equivalent effective annual rate 
exceeds the maximum effective annual interest rate for its respective segment. These 
rates shall be in force for monthly periods, and shall be published in the widest-
circulation newspapers in the country. As an example, below is the rate table for the 
rates set by the BCE corresponding to the month of January 2009: 
 
Table 10: Effective Lending Rates (ELR) - January 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBS 
 
Interest rates on all transactions entered into outside the financial system shall be freely 
contracted, but shall not be able to exceed the maximum effective interest rate for the 
corresponding credit segment. The regulation also establishes the following guidelines 
for certain lending and deposit rates: 
 
o Interest rates on loans from Banco del Estado, Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda 
and Banco Nacional de Fomento shall be freely contracted, but shall not be 
lower than the average cost weighted by amount of the interest-bearing liabilities 
of those institutions.  
 
o Interest rates on loans to financial institutions by Corporación Financiera 
Nacional, including rediscount transactions, shall also be freely contracted, but 
shall not be lower than the average cost weighted by amount of the liabilities of 
Corporación Financiera Nacional. 
 
o Interest rates on all lending transactions by institutions subject to the control of 
the SBS, except occasional overdrafts and agreed overdrafts, shall be freely 
entered into, but no higher than the maximum effective rate for the 
Segment Reference ELR % p.a.
Maximum 
ELR % p.a.
Corporate commercial 9,2 9,3
Commercial SMEs 11,2 11,8
Consumption 15,7 16,3
Retail consumption 18,6 21,2
Housing 10,9 11,3
Extended Accumulation Microcredit 23,0 25,5
Simple Accumulation Microcredit 28,8 33,3
Subsistence Microcredit 31,5 33,9
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corresponding segment. In the case of occasional or agreed overdrafts, the 
interest rate shall not be able to exceed the maximum effective rate for the 
consumer segment.     
 
The Law for the Creation of the Financial Safety Network that was issued in January 
2009 also has several aspects that could affect MFI activity in Ecuador.  
 
This law calls for the setting-up of a Liquidity Fund for the Ecuadorian Financial 
System to act as a lender of last resort, granting liquidity assistance loans to financial 
institutions that must hold their deposit reserves at the BCE. It also created the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation to manage the deposit insurance scheme for institutions within 
the private financial sector established in the country that are subject to the control of 
the SBS.   
 
The law also included within the concept of financial security the maximum rates to be 
applied to lending and deposit services and services of any other nature provided by 
financial institutions that are to be segmented according to the nature of each financial 
institution. It also establishes that the SBS shall authorize in advance the services to be 
freely accepted and received by customers and users, and shall determine the activities 
proper to the normal course of business that do not represent services.  
 
The law also creates the post of customer ombudsman, to be appointed by the SBS from 
a shortlist of three to be submitted by the association of depositors or customers of each 
financial institution, with the job of protecting customer interests, receiving a salary to 
be paid by the institution being monitored.  
 
Lastly, loans granted by financial system institutions subject to the control of the SBS 
have been exempted from all taxes. 
 
Some market participants have indicated that these legislative developments could 
impact on MFI activity, as maximum rates previously applied to nominal loan interest, 
whereas as from the changes they apply to the total financial cost of the transaction, 
making it difficult to cover the operating costs of the transactions. With the reduction in 
interest rates and the elimination of loan commissions, one of the main concerns is the 
impact of the measures on the cooperative system159. 
 
The main impact160 since the setting of maximum rates on lending transactions 
(“interest rate ceilings”) has been as follows: 
 
• Increased average amount of loans 
• Reduction in the placing of loans for amounts of under USD 600 
• Reduction in the placing of loans in areas of limited banking access  
• Increased loan delinquency 
 
- National Microfinance System 
Notable among the public policies and initiatives tending to encourage the development 
of microcredit has been the creation of the National Microfinance System (Sistema 
Nacional de Microfinanzas - SNM)161. This initiative seeks to coordinate public and 
private microcredit programs to avoid duplication of effort and achieve a reduction of 
operating costs and serve as an instrument for the adequate channeling of financial 
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resources to the benefit of solidarity economy activities. The governing authority of the 
system is the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the board of the entity includes 
representatives from the Ministry for Coordination of Social Development (MCDS), the 
Ministry for Coordination of Production, the Ministry of Social Welfare, and a 
representative of the cooperatives and unregulated organizations.       
The SNM is to consist of three main instances: 
 
• The National Microcredit Fund, which will operate as a legal entity subject to 
private law with nationwide jurisdiction, is to channel its resources to the economy 
using a second tier mechanism, operating through regulated and unregulated MFIs 
that have previously qualified for the purpose by means of a mechanism for public 
auctions based on project merit.   
 
• The Strengthening and Training Fund, to operate under federal jurisdiction, which 
will channel its resources towards the strengthening and training of regulated and 
unregulated MFIs (first-tier operators) as well as for the training of end loan 
beneficiaries (microentrepreneurs) through a public tender mechanism for award on 
the basis of project merit. 
 
• The National Network of Microcredit Operators, the main aim of which will be to 
extend the interbank payment system of the Central Bank of Ecuador.  
 
The SNM channels its funds through Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN) and 
Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF). By the end of 2008, the SNM had entered into 
credit transactions with 13 NGOs, 37 Savings and Loan Cooperatives, and the BNF. 
Between January and April 2008, when the SNM operated with a credit fund 
administered by the CFN, 546 loan transactions were entered into for a total amount of 
USD 635,523. From August 2008 through December 31, as part of the Solidarity and 
Social Economy credit line, it channeled 12,753 credit transactions for an amount of 
USD 13,820,873, and under the Human Development Loan Credit (see below) it handed 
out USD 11,616,552 through 61,108 loan transactions162. 
 
Regarding the Solidarity and Social Economy credit line, it can be seen that based on 
the number of loans granted by poverty level, 80.3% have been made to individuals 
with a poverty level in excess of 65%, and 6.1% was granted in localities where the 
poverty level was under 38%. A total of 43% of loans was allocated for activities related 
to the trade sector, 30% for agricultural activities, 13% for services, 8% for the 
handicrafts sector, and the remaining 6% was allocated to other unspecified activities. 
 
Another of the objectives of the PSNM is the development and strengthening of 
institutions that operate in the field of Popular Finance, implemented through two 
initiatives:  
 
o A training scheme was carried out in the northeastern region of the country in 
which 12 such institutions participated, under a cooperation agreement with 
Swisscontac. 
o A training program was developed nationwide with the participation of 73 local 
financial institutions, all members of the National Network of Ecuadorian 
Popular and Solidarity Finances, an organization with which SNM has signed a 
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cooperation agreement, which in turn the Dutch SNV Cooperation Service has 
undertaken to support.  
 
- Corporación Financiera Nacional 
Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN)163 is an autonomous public financial institution 
with legal capacity and indefinite duration. This institution encourages investment and 
promotes sustainable economic growth and competitiveness in productive and service 
sectors in Ecuador. At present, the CFN is the largest fiduciary agent in the country, 
administering an autonomous net worth in excess of USD 1 billion, spread among both 
public and private sector projects, supporting major sectors of the country’s economy 
such as those of finance, electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure, real estate and 
MFIs, among others.    
 
It is a significant second-tier provider of credit for financial institutions (IFI) focusing 
on the granting of microcredit via the “Credimicro” credit line. This program is directed 
at persons with small-scale businesses and sales or gross revenue of up to USD 100,000, 
so they can build up fixed assets and obtain working capital and technical assistance. 
The maximum loan amount is USD 20.000, and the terms for repayment are:     
 
 10 years for fixed assets.  
 3 years for working capital. 
 1 year for technical assistance.  
 
Disbursements by this second-tier entity between January and December 2007 totaled 
USD 109.53 million, with 94% of beneficiaries linked to the “Credimicro” program. Of 
these loans, 63.3% went to commercial banks, 31.1% to cooperatives, and 5.0% to 
finance companies.  
  
- Banco Nacional de Fomento  
Banco Nacional de Fomento164 (BNF) is a nationwide official bank operating a 
microcredit program known as “CreceMás” that targets individuals in the areas of 
production, commerce and services whose total assets do not exceed USD 20,000 and 
who employ up to 10 workers. Finance is provided for up to 100% of the investment 
project to be carried out.    
 
This financing is for working capital and the forming of fixed assets, with an emphasis 
on project profitability. Finance will not be provided for the payment of debt, personal 
consumption needs, payments of leases or the purchase of land and property, purchases 
of vehicles or housing, household appliances not necessary for the development of the 
business activity, furniture for personal use, used equipment or tools, purchases of 
shares or the payment of taxes. Loans may be repaid on a daily, weekly, two-weekly or 
monthly basis, depending on the activity; in the case of agricultural activities, 
repayment will be determined in accordance with the income generated.    
 
For these microcredit transactions, personal guarantees are accepted for individual 
loans, and several guarantees in the case of group loans, while cross-guarantees are not 
acceptable. Depending on the economic situation of the customer, personal guarantees, 
mortgages or pledges may be considered, or a suitable combination of such sureties.   
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With the aim of getting to know the customer and evaluating compliance with the 
commitments to the Bank, a sequential credit policy is applied whereby the first loan is 
for an amount of up to USD 500 and for a maximum term of 4 months.  If cash payment 
is made in a timely manner, the second loan may be for a larger amount and for a longer 
term. Depending on the business and on the basis of a favorable report from the 
microcredit advisor, terms and amounts may be increased. 
 
Another BNF program, coordinated by the MCDS, is the “Human Development 
Microcredit” scheme targeted at individuals listed on the “Human Development Bond” 
program database.  The maximum amount granted is USD 350, and loans are financed 
for investment projects in micro production, commerce or service units. Loans are 
granted at subsidized rates and require no guarantee, as repayment will come from the 
resources of the Social Protection Program. Applicants for loans for account of the 
Human Development Bond must expressly authorize the BNF to credit the Social 
Protection Program an amount of USD 30 against the microcredit granted until it is 
fully settled.     
  
There is a wide range of institutions specializing in MF in Ecuador, including: 4 
specialized regulated institutions, 23 regulated savings and loan cooperatives, over 
1,000 savings and loan cooperatives not regulated by the SBS, around 40 non-
governmental organizations and countless local financial structures: welfare funds, 
popular investment associations, communal banks, pre-coops and others. They currently 
serve over 650,000 microenterprises, covering 45% of all microentrepreneurs in the 
country. These institutions also offer wide coverage, reaching 74% of Ecuador’s 
cantons. Coverage and competition has increased, particularly in urban areas, and this 
has resulted in financial product diversification and effective adjustment. Although 
several institutions are reaching into the rural sector, there is as yet no mass coverage by 
this service in rural areas of the country165.  
 
A significant aspect of the Ecuadorian case has been the sharp MF growth rate in the 
last six years, with notable participation by three commercial banks and regulated credit 
cooperatives,166 as can be seen from the following charts: 
  
Chart 9: Growth in Microenterprise Credit in Ecuador 
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Chart 10: Current Microcredit Segmentation in Ecuador 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Cartera bruta de préstamos en USD (Fuente: SBS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBS - Gross microcredit portfolio in thousands of USD as at September 2008  
 
 
In view of their importance, there follows a brief summary of the history and current 
situation of the leading commercial banks offering microfinance services: Banco 
Pichincha and Banco Solidario.   
 
In October 1998 Banco Pichincha167 hired the services of Acción Internacional to assist 
in the creation of its CREDIFE microcredit program that opened its doors to the public 
in June 1999. Through its structure of 122 branches, CREDIFE was quickly able to 
expand its operations, as can be observed from its current market share (see Chart 10). 
In addition, the large size of the bank ensures a significant source of funding that allows 
CREDIFE to broaden its operations at very competitive rates. Its customer profiles fall 
into the categories of personal or family businesses in the formal and informal sectors, 
and includes small manufacturers, traders and service providers. The average balance of 
loans is in the order of USD 2,300, with a portfolio at risk of 1.5% (December 2007). 
 
Banco Solidario168 was established in Quito in May 1996 through the merger of 
Sociedad Financiera Enlace S.A. and Sociedad Financiera Finambato, which became  
Banco Solidario S.A., the first such initiative in Latin America with a social purpose 
and 100% private capital. In addition to the participation by Acción Internacional in the 
governance of Banco Solidario, both institutions have worked together on the 
development of new products (loans for housing improvement, personal and group farm 
loans), as well as on audit and credit scoring methodologies, among other aspects. Its 
customer profiles fall into the categories of personal or family businesses in the formal 
and informal sectors, and self-employed individuals in the rural and urban sectors. The 
average balance of loans is close to USD 1348, with a risk portfolio of 2.9%169. 
Recently Banco Solidario has been developing remittance services for Ecuadorian 
immigrants in Spain, providing automatic credit approval for families with members 
resident in Spain. 
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3.7. Peru  
 
The general law covering the financial system170 included institutions specializing in the 
providing of microfinance services within the sphere of the Superintendency of Banks 
and Insurance Companies (SBS), classified as follows171: 
 
• Rural Savings and Loan Associations (Caja Rural de Ahorro y Crédito - CRAC): 
These entities take deposits from the public and specialize in granting loans to 
small, medium and micro enterprises in the farm sector.   
• Municipal Savings and Loan Associations (Caja Municipal de Ahorro y Crédito 
- CMAC): These entities take deposits from the public and specialize in granting 
loans to small, medium and micro enterprises. 
• Small and Micro Business Development Companies (Empresa de desarrollo de 
la pequeña y micro empresa - EDPYME): These companies specialize in 
granting loans to small and micro business owners.     
 
A recent decree172 significantly broadened the range of operations that can be performed 
by these institutions, in addition to opening the door to the providing of all other 
operations allowed for commercial banks, as long as they fulfill the requirements laid 
down by the SBS. Although in principle the possibility of taking sight deposits is 
excluded, with CRACs only being able to receive time deposits and savings deposits (as 
well as funds in custody), in practice SBS statistics show that most CMACs and CRACs 
take deposits in excess of the loans granted. Operations that they are in principle 
forbidden to perform include:  
 
• Granting of mortgage and pledge-backed loans,  
• Granting of current account overdrafts, 
• Issue and management of credit cards or debit cards,  
• Issue and placement of bonds and other paper representing debt. 
  
Currently, CMACs are authorized to operate outside their municipalities, in some way 
recognizing their capacity to compete with commercial banks.   
 
Regulated institutions must publish their effective interest rates on Internet, and issue 
annual financial statements. As from 2010 EDPYMEs, CRACs, and CMACs must 
obtain external ratings, as currently required for commercial banks.  
 
There are several NGOs173 and credit cooperatives that continue to operate as 
unregulated MFIs, although the latter are restricted to granting loans to their members, 
mainly for consumption purposes. In practice, NGOs wishing to carry out MF business 
must register with the Superintendence of Public Records and tax, labor and municipal 
authorities. In addition, they can register with the Peruvian International Cooperation 
Agency if they wish to receive international financial assistance. Although these 
requirements are easy to comply with, NGOs must pay a tax on their interest income, 
and they are subject to a cap on the interest rate they are allowed to charge. These 
matters provide a strong incentive for them to become transformed into EDPYMEs. 
These EDPYMEs are institutions that are not authorized to take deposits, and they have 
increased in number (and profitability) so that they have currently exceeded CRACs in 
importance.    
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Regarding portfolio classification rules and the provision requirements for loan losses, a 
special treatment exists for microcredits174 (loan balance must be smaller than 20,000 
Nuevos Soles (NS)175 and a general provision applies of at least 1%). The classification 
of all debtors is made according to the days in arrears with obligations and a specific 
provision must be set up on the basis of that classification. Notwithstanding the specific 
provision regime, regulations require additional procyclical provisions for performing 
loans (in case of microcredits 0.5%) when GDP grows at a rate bigger than 5%. 
 
The second half of the 90s176 saw the first signs in Peru of active public policies and 
promotion instruments for the development of Micro and Small Companies (MYPE), as 
well as the appearance of public institutions to support them. The Microenterprise 
Development Fund (FONDEMI) was created in 1992, and the Program for Small and 
Microenterprises in 1994, both within the sphere of the Ministry of Industry, while the 
Commission for the Promotion of Small and Microenterprises (PROMPYME) was 
created in 1997, within the sphere of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. In the 
last five years a new regulatory framework has been established, and the Bonopyme and 
PROMPYME programs were transferred to the orbit of the Ministry of Labor and 
Promotion of Employment (MTPE)177. The system or institutional model for state 
support for MYPE in Peru consists of several public institutions that divide 
responsibility according to their public function, the type of services offered, the MYPE 
segment they serve, and the sector of the economy. The current regulatory framework 
establishes that the governing body for public MYPE policies is the MTPE.   
 
Mention should be made of three experiences that have provided adequate coordination, 
continuity and clarity for the functions and roles of public policy: 
 
• The experience of PROMPYME in public procurement (through a program for 
facilitation of access by MYPEs to state purchasing and the domestic market).  
• The “Perú Emprendedor” program (previously Bonopyme) designed to provide 
dynamism to the service market and co-finance business development services 
by means of a system of bonds for various MYPE segments: self-employed 
workers and informal microentrepreneurs, micro and small businesses in the 
formal sector, and young persons and women starting up undertakings. The 
financing scheme is novel because it could achieve sustainability.   
• INTERMESA is a council for the promotion of the National Program for the 
Simplification of Local Government Procedures for companies, promoted by 
public sector institutions, international cooperation agencies, local governments, 
unions and business leaders from all sectors, including MYPEs.    
 
- Guarantee Fund for Loans to Small Industries  
Another of the players in this segment is the Guarantee Fund for Loans to Small 
Industries (Fondo de Garantía para Préstamos a la Pequeña Industria - FOGAPI), one 
of the oldest systems of public guarantees in the region, which has increasingly become 
involved with the microfinance segment, offering portfolio guarantees to specialized 
banks. Recently it has opened a credit line for “intermediaries” targeting regulated non-
bank institutions (CMACs, CRACs and EDPYMEs) and NGOs. According to the latest 
available information, by 2004 FOGAPI had granted guarantees on loans to 
microenterprises for an amount of close to USD 35 million, providing coverage of 
50%.178 
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- Law for the Promotion and Inclusion in the Formal Economy of Micro and Small 
Enterprises  
The Law for the Promotion and Inclusion in the Formal Economy of Micro and Small 
Enterprises was passed in August 2003179, with the aim of promoting competitiveness, 
inclusion in the formal economy and development of MYPEs, coordinating all existing 
initiatives. This law establishes objective parameters for MYPEs and creates a National 
Council for MYPE development MYPE (CODEMYPE), the aims of which are the 
approval of a national program for promotion and formal inclusion for MYPE 
competitiveness and development to contribute to coordination and harmonization of 
sector policies and actions for the support of MYPEs at national, regional and local 
level. It establishes that the role of the State should be to promote overall development 
and facilitate access to business services and new undertakings, with the aim of creating 
a suitable environment for their competitiveness, encouraging the development of 
financial and non-financial service markets and promoting training and technical 
assistance via CODEMYPE. In addition, conditions were laid down for the 
PROMPYME program, export promotion and the generation of statistics and databases 
via the National Institute for Statistics and Information Technology.  
 
This law promotes access by MYPEs to financial and capital markets, encouraging 
expansion, solvency and decentralization of those services. It lays down that the State 
must promote the strengthening of those MFIs supervised by the Superintendence of 
Banks and Insurance Companies, and establishes that the Corporación Financiera de 
Desarrollo S.A. (COFIDE) should promote and comprehensively develop diversified, 
decentralized financing, increasing the availability of financial and capital market 
services to the benefit of MYPEs. Subsequent sections establish instruments for the 
simplification of procedures and the obtaining of municipal licenses and permits, and a 
simplified tax regime for MYPEs. The law ends with a chapter dealing with the 
employment regime for microenterprises and complementary regulations.  
 
- Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo S.A. 
Mention should be made of the performance of COFIDE180, “a mixed-capital company 
with administrative, economic and financial autonomy, 98.56% of the capital of which 
is held by the Peruvian State, represented by the Federal Fund for the Financing of 
State Business Activity, depending from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, with 
1.41% owned by Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)”. From the time of its creation 
through to 1992, COFIDE acted as a first-tier bank, then switching to becoming 
exclusively a second-tier development bank, channeling the resources it administers 
solely through the institutions supervised by the Superintendence of Banks and 
Insurance Companies. 
 
“All the lines and loan programs administered by COFIDE are channeled to 
beneficiaries through an Intermediary Financial Institution (IFI): a bank, finance 
house, CRAC, CMAC, EDPYME, cooperative or financial leasing company. IFIs are 
responsible for receiving, grading, approving, disbursing and recovering the loans they 
approve, granted from the resources administered by COFIDE, so that those interested 
in obtaining financing must apply for it at their financial institution of choice. This 
means that each IFI sets the final terms for each transaction, as a result of its own 
credit assessment.”    
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COFIDE programs designed for small companies are summarized on the following 
table181: 
   
Table 11: COFIDE Programs 
 
 
Program 
 
Purpose 
Payment 
term** 
(years) 
Grace 
period 
(years) 
Maximum 
amounts 
(USD) 
Microglobal to 
microenterprise* 
Investment. Working capital 4 1 Average IFI 
portfolio 5,000 
Working capital. Purchase of 
machinery and equipment. 
4 1 Average  IFI 
portfolio 3,000 
 
Productive 
Habitat Purchase, construction, expansion and improvement of 
business premises and housing. 
7 1 Average  IFI 
portfolio 6,000 
FONDEMI Investment. Working capital. 2 1  
 
* Maximum of 10 workers, including owner, total assets USD 20,000 excluding real estate. 
** Payment terms include grace periods. 
 
The Microglobal program is intended to increase credit access for formal and informal 
microenterprises in urban, marginal and rural areas that carry out manufacturing, 
commerce or service activities. Program resources are provided by funds from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), beneficiary contributions and the IFI. The interest 
rate charged to the IFI is set by the Board of COFIDE. In addition, an inspection and 
audit commission is charged on transactions, as well as a commitment commission on 
undrawn balances in the case of loans with more than one drawdown. COFIDE 
disburses funds un US dollars, and repayment must be in the same currency, with the 
IFIs being authorized to grant beneficiaries loans either in US dollars or in local 
currency.    
 
The Productive Habitat program is intended to contribute to improvement in the income 
and consolidation of employment in the Peruvian microenterprise segment. Preference 
is given to borrowers belonging to the sector of the population affected by the “El Niño”    
phenomenon, inhabitants and zones where the Deputy Minister for Housing and 
Construction performs urban development activities, and those regions where the 
Spanish Cooperation Agency carries out its work. Program resources are provided by 
Spain’s State Secretariat for International and Ibero-American Cooperation – SECIPI, 
and COFIDE. End borrowers must be natural or legal persons performing 
manufacturing, agricultural, livestock, fishing, commercial or service activities 
classifiable as microenterprises.   
 
The FONDEMI is a component of the “Perú Emprendedor” program of the MTPE to 
provide financial services, administered by COFIDE as a trust, with funds from the 
European Union and contributions from the public sector. Its purpose is to contribute to 
microenterprise development, channeling resources to finance the requirements of the 
MYPE sector derived from its productive, commercial and service activities. The 
COFIDE, as the entity executing the resources of the FONDEMI, channels the 
resources through the IFIs in the form of credit lines.  
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Peru shows a clear intention to establish market incentives for the development of an 
autonomous microfinance sector similar to the Bolivian case182.  Both the supply and 
demand for MF shows sustained growth in volume and in quality, in breadth (number of 
institutions and customers) and in depth (products, services and customer maturity). In 
the case of volume, the numbers are very clear: more institutions, a rising number of 
new customers, and the existing ones requesting more loans, growth rates at the 
forefront of the financial sector and improved indicators for solvency, liquidity and 
profitability. Despite the recognition of the contribution made to the national economy  
by the micro and small business segment, State involvement has been only marginal and 
it cannot be considered to have been a source of growth. As a result, supply and 
demand, that is to say, the private sector, has been primarily responsible for the growth 
of the segment.183 
 
The micro and small business segment (MYPE) is vitally important to Peru’s economic 
growth, it having been estimated that in 2007 it accounted for 42% of GDP and 74% of 
the economically active population. Peru has one of the largest informal economies in 
Latin America, making a contribution of over 42% in terms of GDP, exceeded only by 
Bolivia and Panama. Recent studies estimate that there are approximately 3.1 million 
business units  with 10 or fewer employees184, and they are receiving a growing offer of 
financial services by a group of companies in the national financial system (the figure 
indicated also includes small farm units).   
 
Within Peruvian MFIs, the performances by Mibanco, a commercial bank specializing 
in MF, and the CMACs are particularly worthy of note, as can be seen from the 
following chart: 
 
Chart 11: Segmentation of Microenterprise Credit in Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBS - Direct loans in millions of Nuevos Soles (NS) - September 2008  
 
 
The significant growth of MFIs and the role played by these institutions in the providing 
of credit for microenterprises in recent years can be seen from the following statistics185: 
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Chart 12: Growth of Lending to Microenterprises in Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SBS - Gross micro-loan portfolio  
 
 
It should also be noted that the portion of the microcredit market in relation to total 
loans has grown from an average of 4.5% in 2001 to 10% in 2008. Another important 
fact is that of the NS 4,902 million (USD 1,578 billion) granted as at September 2008 
by banks, NS 1,993 million (USD 642 million) were accounted for by Mibanco.  
 
Mibanco, together with the CMACs and Edpymes, have made a notable contribution to 
increasing the use of banking services, as these institutions have granted the highest 
proportion of first-time loans, mainly in the small entrepreneur segment186: 
 
Table 12: Ranking of First-Time Bank Service Users 
 
Institution Number of people Percentage
Mibanco 73,632 23.8% 
Edpyme Edyficar S.A. 42,587 13.8% 
Caja Municipal de Ahorros y Créditos de Arequipa 20,438 6.6% 
Caja Municipal de Ahorros y Créditos de Trujillo 17,276 5.6% 
Edpyme Confianza S.A. 13,222 4.3% 
Other institutions 141,785 45. 9% 
Total 308,940 100.0% 
 
Data as at December 2007 
 
Despite the importance of MYPES in Peru in terms of jobs, there has still not been any 
significant progress in increasing levels of formal employment. A new promotion law 
for the sector is currently being debated, as the Law for the Promotion and 
Formalization of Micro and Small Enterprises, passed in September 2003 and still in 
force, didn’t match the expected results. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The public policies implemented in each of the countries studied have been included on 
a comparative table (Annex I). This shows the existence of a wide range of measures 
that have not all been applied simultaneously.  
 
It can be seen that public policies in each of the countries surveyed respond to 
contrasting approaches, with interventionist and pro-market policies existing side-by-
side, in addition to laissez faire approaches (see introduction). This seems to be due to 
the following factors: 
 
- Successive implementation of policies by different governments with a different 
outlook,   
- Initiatives have been adopted simultaneously by various government instances 
(Central Banks, Ministries of Economy, Social Development, etc.) with different 
focuses and strategies. 
 
This has meant that in many cases a policy accumulation process has taken place that is 
not always correctly integrated. Despite this lack of uniformity, the following attempts 
to draw some conclusions from the outcome of some of these initiatives considered to 
be the most relevant.   
 
- The “interest rate” factor 
As mentioned in the introduction, interest rate caps are a classic interventionist measure, 
and specialized international agencies strongly advise against them. Nevertheless, from 
our observation of the countries surveyed where they have been applied (Ecuador, Chile 
and Colombia), it cannot be said that they have been a major obstacle to the 
development of MF. This could be explained by the levels of the maximum rates 
established for microfinance activity; these would appear to have been set sufficiently 
high so as not to hinder MFE operations. In other cases, fees and/or commissions 
(sometimes regulated) are allowed to be charged, which makes it possible to pass on 
part of the higher cost of these operations. Furthermore, countries taking what is in 
principle a “laissez faire” approach, in that they do not set restrictions on interest rates 
(such Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru), record fairly uneven results as regards the 
development of this business. It would therefore seem that the “interest rate” factor does 
not in itself play a significant role in explaining the development of the sector. 
 
- The “financial infrastructure” factor  
This is a pro-market factor that always seems to contribute to the development of MF 
services. We found various examples in the countries selected: non-banking 
correspondents in Brazil and Colombia, microcredit operator networks in Ecuador and 
the entering into of mandate accords between financial and non-financial institutions in 
Bolivia.  In all cases, each country’s financial structure has adopted ways for MF to be 
channeled in an effective manner. For this reason, the construction of adequate 
infrastructure would facilitate the development of the business.    
 
- The “Official bank” factor 
This element is subject to far more debate, as literature classifies government 
participation via official banks and an interventionist policy. In general, these banks 
have been criticized for their tendency to direct loans, as well as in many cases because 
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of their operating inefficiency. Nevertheless, their participation in the countries 
analyzed would seem to have been fairly significant. This has been because of their 
demonstration role for the rest of the sector, the funding they have been able to provide 
to small MFIs, and their ability to serve a large mass of microentrepreneurs through 
their extensive branch networks. In the case of Peru, municipal “cajas” have been 
transformed into one of the main commercial providers of MF services. BancoEstado in 
Chile, and the Crediamigo program in Brazil, operate on a sustainable basis and can 
claim one of the highest market shares.   
      
- The “Credit guarantee systems” factor 
This is another topic much argued about in literature. Classified as a tool of an 
interventionist nature, many criticize it because of the moral hazard that it could give 
rise to. Its defenders argue that such systems are valid, as they cover the cost derived 
from the need to learn about granting loans to a group of agents of whom nothing is 
known.  On the basis of our observations in the region, the design of this factor could 
play a key role in achieving efficient performance. FOGAPE in Chile is a clear example 
of a successful state fund, as it encourages market activity at the same time as it 
minimizes the problems of asymmetric information.   
 
 
An overall evaluation of the different public policies adopted is not a simple task, given 
the degree of diversity that exists. Nevertheless, one common element observed in all 
the countries surveyed is the role played by commercial banks in MF development187. 
This involvement, whether implemented though public or private banks, is closely 
linked to the role adopted by the State.  
 
As indicated, actions by the public sector to build an inclusive financial system can take 
a wide variety of shapes. Deciding which of these policies might be successful will 
depend on the imprint it is sought to give MF. For example, actions by public banks in 
sustainable systems could lead to very different results from those derived from the 
application of non-commercial criteria.  
 
Nevertheless, one should not rush to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of 
public policies without taking into account socio-economic, geographic and cultural 
factors in the countries in which they are implemented. Although such an analysis does 
not form part of this present paper, various statistical sources (see Annex II) enable a 
brief survey to be made of some of these factors and their connection with the level of 
MF development.  
 
In general terms, indicators such as per capita GDP, numbers of poor in urban areas and 
nationwide, and the number of self-employed workers as a percentage of the working 
population throw up figures that reflect clearly different realities. The same happens 
when observing the degree of MF development, although this latter indicator moves in 
the opposite direction to the former.  
 
In those countries where MF has achieved greatest depth, wealth per inhabitant tends to 
be low, while poverty and the proportion of self-employed is high. On the other hand, 
MF is in an incipient stage, or is not very well developed, in economies with better 
social and economic indicators and lower proportions of independent workers.  One 
case that does not follow this logic is that of Chile, where microfinance activity can be 
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considered significant, despite recording better numbers for its economy than the rest of 
the countries selected. Nevertheless, there would seem to be some correlation between 
the economic and social environment and employment levels of a country and the 
providing of microfinance services.  
 
Regardless of the different realities in the countries studied, the visible hand of the 
public sector has been present to support commercial banks as the main providers of 
MF. It has however been observed that only those measures applied on the basis of 
sustainability criteria and a commercial approach have achieved the best and most 
significant results.  
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Annex I: Comparative table of public policies oriented to the promotion of MF 
 
Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru
National legislation 
and financial system 
regulatory framework 
related to MF
Microloan law (26.117) /      
BCRA: microloan category / 
Financing of MFIs / 
Complementary service 
companies / Credit 
cooperative associations / 
Basic savings account
OSCIP /                
Credit cooperatives of 
microentrepreneurs  / SCM 
/ Simplified accounts
Private Financial Funds (FFP) / 
Closed cooperatives and IFDs 
regulation / Non banking financial 
institutions regulation / Special 
prudential regulation (Mutual 
societies, FFP, opened and closed 
cooperatives and IFD). Specialized in 
MF commercial banks.
Financial consultancies / 
Savings and Loan 
Cooperatives (CAC)
Microcredit system 
definition / Real state 
microcredit definition / 
Commercial financial 
companies / Savings 
accounts
Segments for microcredits 
definition (3 categories: 
Subsistence, Simple 
accumulation and Extended 
accumulation). Specialized banks 
/ credit cooperatives (regulated 
and not regulated) / ONG
Specialized banks / 
CMAC / CRAC / 
EDPYME / Law for the 
promotion and Inclusion 
in the formal Economy of 
micro and small 
Enterprises
Public banks 
(direct MF) BAPRO 
Banco do Nordeste 
(CREDIAMIGO) / Banco 
Popular do Brasil
BancoEstado 
Microempresas (BEME)
Banco Nacional de Fomento 
(BNF)
Interest rate 
liberalization Free Free Free
Agreed maximum rate 
(law 18.010)
Maximum rate / 
Commissions and fees 
(law 590)
Law for the regulation of the 
effective maximum cost of credit Free
Subsidies implicit subsidies  (law 26.117)
Lowers interest rates loans (Banco 
de Desarrollo Productivo and 
FONDESIF)
Solidarity and Social 
Investment Fund 
(FOSIS) / INDAP 
(Working Capital Bond)
Financial 
infrastructure Mobile branches
Non-banking 
correspondents
Financial intermediation mandates 
between regulated and not regulated 
institutions
Non-banking 
correspondents
National network of microcredit 
operators
Credit guarantee 
systems
Guarantee Fund of  Buenos 
Aires  (FOGABA) 
Guarantee Fund for 
Small Entrepreneurs 
(FOGAPE)
National fund for 
guarantees (FNG)
Guarantee Fund for 
Loans to Small 
Industries (FOGAPI)
Second-tier funds 
Social capital Fund 
(FONCAP) / Bco. Ciudad / 
BNA / BAPRO (Fuerza 
solidaria program) / Microloan 
law (26.117)
Banco Nacional do 
Desenvolvimento 
Económico e Social 
(BNDES) / National 
Program of Oriented 
Productive Microcredit 
(PNMPO)
Banco de Desarrollo Productivo / (ex 
NAFIBO) / FONDESIF
INDAP (Financial 
Administration Fund)
Industrial development 
institute (Finurbano 
program)
Corporación Financiera Nacional 
(CFN) / National microcredit fund 
(FNM)
COFIDE (Microglobal 
and Productive Habitat 
programs ) / 
Microenterprise 
Development Fund 
(FONDEMI)
Others
Exception to the mandatory 
reserve requirement on 
financing from abroad 
Directing of deposits 
National Corporation for 
Indigenous Development 
(CONADI) / Technical 
Cooperation Service 
(SERCOTEC)
Banks and government 
agreement
Entrepreneurial Culture
Tax exemption 
Taxes exemption for active 
operations / Strengthening and 
Training Fund
PROMPYME / Perú 
Emprendedor program / 
INTERMESA
Public policies Countries
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Annex II: Socio-economic statistics 
 
Loan 
portfolio1 Debtors
1
% of loan 
portfolio in South 
America1
% of debtors 
in South 
America1
Debtors1 / 
EAP2
GDP per 
capita3
% of poor 
in urban 
areas2
% of poor 
nationwide2
Self-employed 
workers / Working 
population2
Argentina 13 17 0,11% 0,27% 0,1% 12.054 21% - 16%
Bolivia 1.505 746 13% 12% 17% 3.882 54% 64% 44%
Brazil 386 628 3% 10% 1% 9.086 30% 33% 22%
Chile 1.083 369 9% 6% 6% 13.032 14% 14% 16%
Colombia 3.254 1.432 28% 23% 6% 7.317 45% 47% 38%
Ecuador 1.090 403 9% 6% 6% 6.978 40% 43% 32%
Peru 3.675 2.361 31% 38% 17% 7.094 31% 45% 42%
Selected countries 11.006 5.956 93% 95% - - - - -
South America 11.810 6.251 100% 100% 3% - 30% 35% -  
 
Loan portfolio in millions of USD 
Debtors in thousands 
EAP: Economically Active Population 
GDP per capita: gross domestic product per capita valued according to PPP (purchasing power parity) USD 
Poor per geographical area over total population 
Self-employed workers: self-employed workers and their parents (without technical or professional qualifications) 
 
1 Source: MIX MARKET. Voluntary information 
2 Source: CEPAL 
3 Source: IMF 
(last available data)  
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Annex III: Microfinance and socio-economic statistics 
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26 Source BNA. 
27 Andares (2006) 
28 Alternativa 3, FIE Gran Poder, FIS Empresa Social, Fundación Pro Vivienda Social, Entre Todos, 
Fundación Progresar, Fundación Grameen Mendoza, Banco Mundial de la Mujer / INTIHUACA, Pro 
Mujer Argentina, Columbia Microcréditos and Carta Austral.  
29 Two of these are connected with local commercial banks. 
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to classify and set up provisions on consumer loans. 
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52 By means of Circular 34/2008 dated March 10, SBEF incorporated IFDs within the scope of its 
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53 CEP (2008). 
54 www.finrural-bo.org 
55 FINRURAL, Self-regulation system. 
56 The minimum capital required capital by the new regulation is100,000 SDRs (USD 149,000) 
cooperative societies, and 300,000 (USD 447,000) SDRs for IFDs. 
57 CEP (2008). 
58 Navajas and Schreiner, 1998.  
59 Supreme Decree 29,272, September 2007. 
60 www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2007010204 
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70CEP (2008). 
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gross operating result. 
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73 BCB Resolution 3.058 dated December 2002 
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76 1999 
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85 Exchange rate at 12/31/2008: 2.34 reais per dollar  
86 MP 122 (2003), currently Law 10.735 (2003) 
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88 Exchange rate at 12/31/2008: 2.34 reais per dollar 
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89 Exchange rate at 12/31/2008: 2.34 reais per dollar. 
90 MP 226 and Decree 5.288, ratified as from transformation of the measure into Law  11.110 ( 2005) 
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wages paid by companies in the formal sector of the economy; part of these funds are allocated to funding 
of national employment system policies, workforce intermediation, unemployment insurance, 
professional re-training, unemployment data and work generation programs. 
92 Exchange rate at 12/31/2008: 2.34 reais per dollar. 
93  Law 11.110 (2005) and ECLAC-Cooperazione Italiana (2006). 
94 Banco do Nordeste (2005). 
95 www.bnb.gov.br 
96 The INEC was founded in 1993 at the initiative of officers of Banco do Nordeste, and was later 
transformed into an OSCIP with a staff of collection agents, administrative and credit advisors, 
coordinators and human resource experts. 
97 Exchange rate at 12/31/2003: 2.89 reais per dollar. 
98 Cooperative banks, development agencies, and central credit cooperatives.   
99 BCB (2007) and BPB (2008).  
100 Law 10.194 (SCMs), MP 2.172-32 (exception to the nullity of contractual terms in relation to 
stipulations regarding usury –The Usury Act).  
101 BCB (2007). 
102 Exchange rate at 12/29/2006: 2.14 reais per dollar. 
103 Exchange rate at 12/29/2006: 2.14 reais per dollar. 
104 BCB (2007)  
105 The Caixa Economica Federal is a public financial institution linked to the Economy Ministry, acting 
nationwide. It forms part of the National Financial System and assists in the execution of the Federal 
Government’s credit policy. Therefore, as in the case of all other financial institutions, it is subject to the 
decisions and the regulatory discipline of the competent authorities and the supervision of the BCB. 
Soure: http://www1.caixa.gov.br/idiomas/espanhol/estructura.asp 
106 Exchange rate at 12/30/05: 2.33 reais per dollar. 
107 CREDIAMIGO (2007). The delinquency rate is defined as the portfolio at risk aged over 30 days= 
total balance of transactions with arrears of between 30 and 360 days/ gross amount of loans and credit 
(with loan operation provisions). 
108 Exchange rate at 12/29/2006: 2.14 reais per dollar. 
109 Law 18.010 
110 The current rate is the average rate charged by banks and financial institutions in Chile on their 
domestic transactions. 
111 Ley de Cooperativas. Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción; Subsecretaría de 
Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción (latest change: Law 20190 06/05/2007). 
112 Loans from CAC under the control of the banking supervisor represent more than 80% of the loan 
stock for that industry. Since the legal reform was introduced, three new CACs have been included within 
the scope of banking supervision. (SBIF 2007) 
113 1 Unidad de Fomento is equal to $ 21.453,26. Exchange rate at 30/12/2008: 629.11 Chilean pesos per 
dollar.  
114 Law 18.989 
115 http://www.indap.gob.cl/ 
116 INDAP operates participation agreements with 18 institutions, consisting of 3 Banks, 9 Cooperatives 
and 6 Foundations: Banks: BancoEstado Microempresas, Banco del Desarrollo Microempresas, 
Santander Banefe; CAC: Abamcoop, Andescoop, Casual, Chilecoop, Coocretal, Credicoop, Detacoop, 
Limarí, O"Higgins, Oriencoop and others.  
117 INDAP currently operates Administration Contracts with 8 Financial Institutions, consisting of 2 
Banks and 6 CACs. Banks: Banco del Desarrollo Microempresas, Banco Santander Banefe; CAC: 
Abamcoop, Casual, Coocretal, Credicoop, Detacoop, Oriencoop.  
118 http://www.conadi.cl/fondodesarrolloIV.html 
119 Created by Law 19.253 (1993) 
120 http://www.sercotec.cl/ 
121 http://www.laopinon.cl/admin/render/noticia/16373 
122 Exchange rate at 12/30/2008: 629.11 Chilean pesos per dollar. Chilean peso / UF = 21,453.26 at the 
same date. 
123 In comparison, the default rate for the banking system totaled 1.01%. 
124 BancoEstado (2004). 
 69
                                                                                                                                               
125  Banco Sol 3.9%; Crediamigo 1.5%; MiBanco 2.2%; Compartamos 0.4%. 
126 See Planet Rating’s report on Banco del Desarrollo at www.MixMarket.org 
127 SBIF (2007). 
128 Although it should be taken into account that the financial cost to microenterprises includes not only 
the interest charged but also other components such as commissions and other charges. 
129 Decree 4327 Art. 1, merger of Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia and Superintendencia de 
Valores de Colombia. 
130 Decree 663 (1993):  Banks, financial corporations, savings and loan corporations, commercial finance 
companies, financial cooperatives.  
131 Law 795 (2003) Art. 3 
132 Law 590 - 2000 
133 This was later changed to total assets for between 100,000 and 610,000 tax value units (USD 1,1 
million and 6.5 million as at January 2009). Source: http://www.dian.gov.co. For 2009 the minimum 
wage has been set at the equivalent to $ 497,000 = USD 224. 
134 Section 6 of Decree 2.206 dated 1963. 
135 Law 45 Sect. 68. – 1990 - For all legal purposes interest shall be considered to be the sums received by 
the creditor from the debtor for no consideration other than that of the loan granted, even when justified 
on the grounds that they are fees, commissions or other similar items. In addition, interest shall include 
sums paid by the debtor for services related directly to the loan in excess of the sums indicated by the 
regulations. 
136 Exchange rate at 01/20/2009: 2227.68 Colombian pesos per USD. Based on information published by 
Banco de la República de Colombia. http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_ts_cam.htm#tasa 
137 Ditto footnote 135. 
138 Law 1014 – 2006.  
139 Regulations for the creation, organization and operation of the Opportunity Bank Investment Program: 
Compes No. 3424 - May 16, 2006 – The Opportunity Bank: A Policy to promote access to credit and 
other financial services, in the search for social equity. Decree No. 3078 - September 8, 2006 – Ministry 
of Economy and Public Credit – Whereby the Opportunity Bank Investment Program is created. Decree 
No. 4389 – December 5, 2006 - Ministry of Economy and Public Credit -  whereby Decree 3078 dated 
2006 is modified. Decree No. 1695 – May 16, 2006 - Ministry of Economy and Public Credit -   
Modifying Decree 3078 dated 2006, modifying Decree 4389 dated 2006. 
140 Decree 4090 
141 This is a technical agency of the State responsible for the overall supervision of the solidarity economy 
in Colombia. It controls companies in the solidarity economy, which are those set up by a given number 
of people with the aim of creating and organizing a legal entity under private law, the activities of which 
must be carried out with a social purpose and not for profit (cooperative public administrations, mutual 
associations, work cooperatives, specialized savings and loan associations, specialized associations 
without savings, etc.) Sources: http://www.supersolidaria.gov.co, http://www.colombiestad.gov.co/, and 
http://www.gestiopolis.com/.  
142 Defined in Sect. 39 of Law 590 (2000), on microcredit systems, as mentioned previously.  
143 Decree 2233 
144 Section 870. Tax on Financial Transactions -GMF- and Section 871. Events Generating GMF. Source: 
Estatuto Tributario República de Colombia Book Six: Tax on Financial Transactions - 
https://www.icesi.edu.co/cienfi/images/stories/pdf/estatuto_tributario_libro_vi.pdf 
145 UVT: unit of tributary value, with which one will periodically update all the taxes. 
146 Fundación Microfinanzas BBVA is an institution created by Grupo BBVA in the context of its 
corporate responsibility actions (RC). This autonomous foundation of the BBVA Group has a fund of 200 
million euros, and reinvests the yields from these funds in the entities in which it participates, with no 
profit for BBVA. 
147 http://www.bancamia.com.co/compania_historia.php 
148 Survey of the informal credit market - USAID and the MIDAS Program (2007). 
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